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Abstract
We use laboratory experiments to study the causal effects of favorable and unfavorable com-
petitive market experience on cooperation in a subsequent social dilemma game. The issues
we study are part of the broader topic of whether there are behavioral spillovers between
different spheres of social interactions. Market interaction takes place in a continuous double
auction market in which one side of the market obtains the larger part of the surplus. We
examine the efficiency of subsequent cooperation for pairs of market-winners, market-losers
and mixed pairs and study both the cases where interaction in the social dilemma is with
others from the same market, ‘market-partners’, and where it is with others from another
market, ‘market-strangers’, and compare it with benchmark behavior in a stand-alone social
dilemma game. We find that in market-partners, market experience has adverse effects on the
efficiency of cooperation on both market-winner and market-loser pairs. In market-strangers,
pairs of market-winners manage to cooperate more efficiently. These results indicate that it is
not market experience per se that lowers the ability to cooperate. Rather, having competed
for scarce resources on the same side of the market makes it difficult to overcome the social
dilemma and positive market experience fosters cooperation only for those who did not have
to compete with each other. We also show that differences in cooperation cannot be ex-
plained by ex-ante income differences and find that market experience also affects subjective
well-being and social value orientation.
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JEL: A13, C92, D30, J50, M50
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1 Introduction
In economics markets are traditionally studied separately from other spheres of social interaction,
with the focus of analysis typically being on the allocation of resources in the markets in question.
This way of proceeding is certainly meaningful when the focus is solely on the efficient allocation
of scarce resources. However, studying markets in isolation can lead to important omissions in
our understanding of their overall welfare effects, by disregarding possible spillovers of market
activity onto interaction in other spheres of social and economic life.
Market competition is commonly considered to be a beneficial force and there is no doubt
that competitive markets can lead to efficient allocations of resources, as suggested by many
field observations and demonstrated theoretically in the First and Second Welfare Theorems
(see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995) and empirically in experiments with double auctions and other
competitive market institutions (see Smith, 1962, for the seminal paper and Davis and Holt,
1993, for a survey). However, an important question is whether the efficiency effect of markets is
not be circumscribed to the market environment itself but extends beyond it, thereby affecting
efficiency in other spheres. This seems especially relevant in relation to interactions through
personal exchange where cooperation can not be completely regulated through formal contracts.
In this paper we study this, by exploring whether, and if so how, market experience affects the
efficiency of cooperation in a social dilemma situation.
Spillover effects may also interact with the fact that market participation can take place under
different conditions. A salient feature of modern market societies is that the productive assets
– including human capital – that allow people to generate wealth and income are distributed
rather unequally (see, e.g., Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015). As a consequence, some people’s skills
or assets are in high demand in the market, with many others trying to transact with them, while
those of others are in much lower demand. Some people may even have difficulties to trade at all.
Moreover, for many individuals being in a favorable or unfavorable market situation will be con-
stant over their life-time; often it even carries over between generations (Restuccia and Urrutia,
2004; Black et al., 2005). The most prominent case of such situations are labor markets where
a large number of low-skilled workers compete for a limited number of jobs, implying wage
inequalities and involuntary unemployment (e.g., Marquis et al., 2014)
Another important circumstance that may matter for the efficiency of cooperation is whether
one is immersed into a social dilemma situation with somebody, one also has to compete with
in the same market or not. The question arises whether different market experiences will affect
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the efficiency of interaction in spheres where cooperative behavior outside a market setting is
necessary to achieve efficient outcomes. An example at hand, is voluntary contributions to local
public goods in low income neighborhoods where neighbors may compete fiercely for jobs on the
same labor market versus high income neighborhoods where neighbors are unlikely to be direct
competitors on the labor market. More generally, different market positions may affect the social
capital of people and thereby undermine the ability to cooperate efficiently. For instance, Lelkes
(2010) documents that poor people are more likely to be isolated than non-poor.
We use laboratory experiments to address these questions because these allow us to study
the effect of participating in a market under different conditions on the efficiency of voluntary
cooperation in a causal way and under highly controlled conditions. Specifically, we compare
behavior in a social dilemma game that is preceded by market interaction with behavior in the
absence of market interaction. In our study, market interaction takes place in a highly competitive
continuous double auction (see Smith, 1962). In experiments, the double auction has been shown
to be the institution that best embodies the characteristics of efficient markets where prices and
transactions come about through a decentralized equilibrating process, that converges to the
Walrasian outcome (see, e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993). It is the effect on cooperation of having
experienced such highly competitive and efficient markets we are interested in.
Next to a general effect of competitive market experience, our experimental set-up also allows
us to explore two specific dimensions of how market participation may spill over to non-market
social dilemma environments. First, we can investigate if and how effects differ depending on
whether people are on the favorable or unfavorable side of the market. We achieve this by using
a so-called box-design of competitive markets that involve a long and a short side of the market
(Holt et al., 1986). This asymmetry corresponds to market conditions in which individuals on
one side of the market will easily make transactions at favorable prices, whereas individuals
on the other side of the market will have difficulties to make transactions and will do so at
unfavorable prices, if they transact at all. This feature represents in a stark way the very unequal
opportunities that exist in some market economies or market segments (e.g., labor markets for
high and low skilled workers). In our context, earnings differentials will arise endogenously from
market interaction as a consequence of these different opportunities. That is, so-called market-
winners will have high earnings, whereas so-called market-losers will have much lower earnings.
We will control for the effect of these earnings differences on behavior in the social dilemma
situation. Our focus, however, will be on the implications of the different market experiences
distinct market participants will have.
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The second dimension of market experience relates to whether people have to overcome the
social dilemma problem together with people with whom they have or have not had a joint
market experience. It may make a difference whether someone has to supply a public good
jointly with a neighbor who is competing for the same job or with somebody who is not seen as
a competitor on the labor market. Similarly, in a social dilemma situation, people may behave
differently towards a potential employer or employee than to somebody with whom one has not
traded with (and will not trade with in the future).
The social dilemma game we use is a repeated two-person public goods game in which pairs
are fixed throughout all rounds. Public goods games are a standard tool for studying cooperation
(Chaudhuri, 2011; Kagel and Roth, 2012). To study the first dimension of differences in market
experience, we implement in the social dilemma game different pairings of participants from
the same and opposite market sides. This allows us to explore the impact of being respectively
market-winner and market-loser on the efficiency of cooperation. To study the second dimension,
we also vary whether pairings in the social dilemma game come from the same market, market-
partners, or from different markets, market-strangers. Finally, our set-up also allows us to explore
interaction effects between the two discussed dimensions of market experience.
Our study of possible spillovers of market competition relates to the broader issue of the influ-
ence of institutions on preferences, which is an under-explored topic in economics. Fehr and Hoff
(2011) argue that economists’ traditional reluctance to explain changes in behavior in terms of
changes in preferences was partially motivated by the difficulty of producing conclusive scien-
tific evidence in favor of the preferences hypothesis with natural data. Given this difficulty
they suggest that the use of experimental data (field, natural and quasi-experimental) may be
a promising strategy for learning more about this issue. Relatedly, van Winden (2012) argues
that to understand relationships between people one needs to take into account the existence
of social ties and how they are affected by the context in which social interactions take place.
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) present an extensive survey of the evidence documenting that
social motivations are not necessarily separable from the environment and experiences related to
the environment.
In the economics literature, two contrasting views are identifiable in relation to potential
spillover effects of markets on cooperative non-market environments. Vernon Smith (1998) builds
on Adam Smith to postulate that people intuitively know how to behave both in a cooperative and
in a competitive way depending on the context. According to this view, both behaviors grow out
of a universal propensity for social exchange which “finds expression in both personal exchange in
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small-group social transactions and in impersonal trade through large-group markets.” (Smith,
1998, p.3) Smith sees cooperative and non-cooperative behavior as peacefully coexisting, with
efficiency in impersonal markets being based on competitive behavior, while efficiency in personal
social and economic exchange requires reciprocity.
Henrich et al. (2001) extend this argument and suggest that market interaction can have
positive effects on cooperation. They study behavior in ultimatum games, public good games and
dictator games in 15 small-scale societies with a variety of economic and cultural conditions and
relate the results to a non-experimental measure of market integration. They find that “the higher
the degree of market integration (...) the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games.”
(Henrich et al., 2001, p.74) The rationale for this relation proposed by these authors is that
“the more frequently people experience market transactions, the more they will also experience
abstract sharing principles concerning behaviors towards strangers (...).” (Henrich et al., 2001,
p.76) This is consistent with the notion of doux commerce as put forward among others by
Montesquieu (1748) already in the eighteenth century.
In contrast, Bowles (1998) suggests that market participation can adversely effects people’s
personality. Specifically, he argues that “(...) there are significant differences in the personality
effects on participants in markets (...) for people on the short side (...) and those on the long side
of the market, some of which are simply excluded from the exchange process, while others fear
losing the transactions they have secured.” (Bowles, 1998, p.78) Bowles’ concerns can be seen
as part of the broader question asking whether market exchange erodes moral and civic goods
worth preserving. Sandel (2012, 2013), for instance, argues that certain market exchanges are
objectionable on moral grounds and may also crowd out non-market norms.1
The diverging views on the potential spillover effects of market participation call for empirical
work that can provide insights into their relative merits. If the negative spillover effects of market
participation discussed by Bowles indeed affected the efficiency of voluntary cooperation this
would be a major challenge for societies in which markets play a central role.2 However, as
mentioned above, there are also reasons to believe that market participation is innocuous or has
even beneficial effects on the efficiency of non-market interactions. With our study we want to
contribute on shedding light on this important issue.
1For a survey of different views of market society, see Fourcade and Healy (2007).
2Our focus is on spillover effects on efficiency, because they are more directly economically relevant. However,
spillover effects could also be on psychological dimensions like efficacy as captured in the Rotter score (see Rotter,
1966) or social dominance orientation (see Sidanius and Pratto, 2004).
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In the field non-market interactions are affected by a multitude of factors which makes it
difficult to tease out the effect of market experience on the basis of field data. The use of
laboratory experiments makes it possible to study spillover effects of market participation with a
high degree of control under ceteris paribus conditions. Specifically, we are able to exogenously
assign participants to the two sides of the market. Without laboratory control naturally more
cooperative people might be over-represented on one or the other side. Similarly, we are able
to control the composition of the groups in the subsequent social dilemma and, hence, study
behavior for all possible matchings between participants with different market experiences.3
The comparisons between the distinct matchings in the social dilemma we focus on are in-
spired by the work of Henrich et al. (2001) and by the remarks of Bowles (1998). First, the
findings of Henrich et al. (2001) suggest that pro-social behavior is enhanced by market inte-
gration with strangers. We explore whether the efficiency of cooperation indeed depends on
whether it takes place between people who compete in the same market (market-partners) or
on different markets (market-strangers). This distinction is meant to capture the distinction
between more local markets, where the same people compete for scarce resources and have to
cooperatively provide a public good, and more anonymous interactions, where the sets of people
one is, respectively, competing and cooperating with are distinct.
Second, our comparison of behavior in the social dilemma for matchings of people that have
been on the long side or on the short side of the market corresponds quite directly to the one
proposed by Bowles. It will allow us to explore whether matchings of lucky market-winners
behave differently from matchings of unlucky market-losers. Importantly, our experimental set-
up includes a treatment which allows us to separate the effects of being on the short or long
side of the market, from that of obtaining higher or lower earnings. This is crucial, because we
are interested in the consequences of different market experiences and not in those of income
differences generated by different market experiences. As different market positions inevitably
are associated with different earnings potentials, this separation would be virtually impossible
with field data.
In brief our main results are as follows. For market-partners competitive market experience
has adverse effects on efficient cooperation in both market-winner and market-loser matchings.
In market-strangers, matchings of market-winners manage to cooperate more efficiently. These
results indicate that it is not market experience per se that lowers the ability to cooperate.
3Another advantage of lab experiments is that the possibility of replication allows for a systematic study of the
relevant issues. See Falk and Heckman (2009) for a recent methodological discussion of laboratory experiments.
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Rather, having competed for scarce resources on the same market makes it difficult to overcome
the social dilemma, virtually irrespective of having been a market-loser or market-winner. More-
over, positive market experience can foster cooperation, but only for those who did not have
to compete with each other before. These differences in cooperation cannot be explained by
differences in earnings. In addition, we also take self-assessed measures of experienced well-being
and incentivized measures of social value orientation. Our results suggest that market experience
affects both subjective well-being and social value orientation.
2 Related Experimental Literature
There are a number of related experimental papers studying the effect of competition on behavior,
but none of them deals with how interaction in competitive markets affects subsequent efficiency
in cooperation. Brandts et al. (2009) study the effects of competitive rivalry on the disposition
towards others and on subjective well-being. They focus on pure rivalry and chose a design of a
finitely repeated interaction between fixed triads of players, where one of the three players can
in each round choose with whom of the other two players to play a prisoner’s dilemma game,
leaving the third player without interaction. After the interaction rounds, measures of subjects’
disposition towards others and experienced well-being were taken. The authors find that rivalry
has indeed a differential impact on individuals depending on which side of the rivalry they were
on. It negatively affects experienced well-being of those on the powerless side of the interaction
and has a positive effect for the powerful player leading to a larger inequality in experienced
well-being. Interacting under rivalry also affects negatively the disposition towards others.
Bauernschuster et al. (2013) study how competition between two investors interacts with
trust and trustworthiness in simple one-shot trust games. They find that competition among
trustors does not significantly increase sent amounts. However, trustees react to competition
between trustors by lowering return ratios. Similarly, Huck et al. (2012) study a repeated binary
trust game that resembles a market for an experience good with a fixed price where the buyer
can choose whether to trust or not and the seller can only choose quality. Without competition,
buyers are in each period randomly assigned to sellers. With competition, buyers choose in each
period the seller from whom they want to buy. The authors report that the introduction of
competition is highly effective, with market efficiency rising from 30 to over 80 percent.
Herz and Taubinsky (2013) study how experience with competition shapes fairness stan-
dards. In their experiment participants first take part in ultimatum games with either proposer
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or responder competition and then play the standard ultimatum game. They find that respon-
ders’ acceptance thresholds are higher for responders that started in the game with proposer
competition than for those who started in the game with responder competition.
Carpenter and Seki (2006) report on a field experiment conducted with three groups of work-
ers from a fishing community in Japan, where the different groups were exposed to different
amounts of competition on-the-job. The results show that these differences explain differences in
cooperation in an experimental setting. Specifically, fishermen and traders, who interact in more
competitive environments are significantly less cooperative than staff who faces little competition
on the job.
Falk and Szech (2013) study behavior in a context in which market exchange can produce
a negative externality – in their case the death of mice. They find that repeated market in-
teraction typically yields less socially responsible behavior than one-shot non-market behavior.
Bartling et al. (2015) present a comparison of social concern between Switzerland and China.
They study behavior in both a non-market and a market context. They find that in both coun-
tries subjects exhibit less social concern in a market than in a non-market environment. In
addition, they find that while there is no cross-country difference in behavior in a non-market
context, in a market context social concern is lower in China than in Switzerland.
Two studies compare the effects of interacting under tournament and under piece-rate incen-
tives of subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk on subsequent behavior. Buser and Dreber (2013)
find that individuals are significantly less cooperative in a public goods game after having inter-
acted under tournament incentives than under piece-rate. In contrast, Chen (2011) finds that
“...the moral influences of competition are ameliorative in ways that philosophers and economists
have traditionally considered ameliorative” (p. 27).
Our focus and set-up is different from these previous studies. We are interested in exploring
the efficiency effects of the societal experience of market competition in a situation where virtually
all market power is on one side of the market, whereas the other side has to scramble to obtain the
crumbs of the exchange surplus, as captured in the notion of the reserve army of labor introduced
by Engels (1845).4 In addition, we explore if and how these different market power experiences
interact with whether or not one has to solve the social dilemma with those one also had to
compete with on the market. We believe that the effects of such situations are of socio-economic
4Some observers, see e.g. Standing (2011), consider that in modern globalized economies there now exists a
new reserve army of labor, comprised of temporary and part-time workers, who lack any type of job security.
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importance and need to be studied in depth. We are not aware of any other experimental work
on the matter. In Section 5 we develop specific hypotheses regarding these effects.
3 Experiment Design
Our design has three main building blocks: (1) measurements of subjective well-being and social
value orientation, (2) a highly competitive continuous double auction market (hereafter, DAM)
and (3) a social dilemma game (hereafter, SDG). Our design consists of four treatments, two
market treatments in which the DAM is played before the SDG, and two control treatments in
which the SDG is played in isolation. The two market treatments differ in the matching of players
in the subsequent SDG and the two control treatments differ in the income subjects receive before
playing the SDG. All treatments also involve two measurements of subjective well-being and of
social value orientation. We first describe in detail the two market treatments followed by a
description of the control treatments.5
3.1 The Two Market Treatments
Both market treatments consisted of eight parts. Table 1 shows the sequence of events. At
the very beginning, participants were informed that the experiment would have several parts.
Instructions for the various parts were given separately for each part, except those for parts 3
and 4 which were presented together.
Table 1. Sequence of events in market treatments
1. Self-assessment of subjective well-being (SWB 1)
2. Measurement of social value orientation (SVO 1)
3. Double auction market (18 rounds) (DAM)
4. Social dilemma game (6 rounds) (SDG)
5. Self-assessment of subjective well-being (SWB 2)
6. Measurement of social value orientation (SVO 2)
7. Surprise restart social dilemma game (12 rounds) (sSDG)
8. Post-experiment questionnaire
In part 1 (SWB 1) all participants had to answer a self-assessment question to measure their
initial subjective well-being and in part 2 (SVO 1) they had to make money allocation decisions
to measure their social value orientation. In part 3 (DAM) they interacted in 18 rounds of the
DAM and in part 4 (SDG) in six rounds of the SDG. In parts 5 and 6 (SWB 2 and SVO 2,
5The experiment instructions can be found in Appendix B.
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respectively) participants had again to self-assess their subjective well-being and make money
allocation decisions to measure post interaction social value orientation. Part 7 (sSDG) consisted
of a ‘surprise’ restart of the SDG, lasting for 12 rounds. In part 8, participants answered questions
about their individual characteristics.
Parts 1 and 2: SWB 1 and SVO 1. In SWB 1 we recorded participants’ response to
the subjective well-being question shown in Figure 1. These initial measurement provides the
baseline to which the second measurement will be compared. Subjects were asked to mark the
number related to the expression of the manikin that best corresponded to how they felt at
that moment.6 In the figure, “1” corresponds to the highest level and “9” to the lowest level of
subjective well-being.
Note: ”1” indicates highest level, ..., ”9” indicates lowest level of
subjective well-being
Figure 1. Subjective well-being self-assessment
In SVO 1 we recorded participants’ social value orientation using the so-called circle-test.
The circle-test is a modified and incentivized version of the ring-test (Liebrand, 1984) and was
successfully applied by, among others, Sonnemans et al. (2006) and Brandts et al. (2009). It
is a simple task which allows for a quantification of individuals’ social value orientation by
determining the readiness of individuals to help or hurt others at some cost to themselves.
Figure 2 shows an example of a circle-test as used in the experiment.
In the circle-test a person’s social value orientation is measured by a single decision which
consists of the selection of a point on a circle. Each point on the circle represents an allocation
S of Experimental Currency Units (ECU) to the person who makes the choice (Self) and an
allocation O of ECU to another person (Other). The amounts allocated can be positive or
negative, with S2 + O2 = 2002. Note, that each point on the circle corresponds to a certain
angle of the line connecting that point with the origin, which we will use as the measure of social
value orientation. For instance, an angle of 0 degrees corresponds to selfishness as it allocates
6These figures, developed by Lang (1980), are based on Sonnemans (1991).
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Translation:
With the help of the mouse, choose a point on the circle.
Remember that you can change the decision as many times as
you want.
When you are finished press OK.
NOTE: Remember that you will not interact with the
participant to whom you assign ECU in any other part of the
experiment and that reciprocity between matched pairs is not
possible.
For myself: 180.11 ECU
For the other: 86.95 ECU
Figure 2. Social value orientation circle test
200 ECU to oneself and 0 ECU to the other; an angle of 90 degrees is interpreted as altruistic
as it gives 0 to oneself and 200 to the other. Generally, between 0 and 90 degrees an increasing
angle is interpreted as increasing pro-sociality. A negative angle, which reduces the earnings of
the other at some cost to oneself, identifies competitiveness.7
In the experiment the circle appeared on participants’ computer screens. Participants re-
ceived computerized instructions about how to make the decision and had ample opportunity to
practice.8 Decisions in the circle-test had pecuniary consequences. The chosen ECU translated
into money earnings at the exchange rate of 100 ECU to e1. As matched others were random
and anonymous, SVO 1 measures the social value orientation towards generalized others. Sub-
jects were not informed about the decision of ‘their’ others in the circle-test until the very end
of the session.
Parts 3 and 4: DAM and SDG. Our main interest lies in potential effects of market
experience on efficient cooperation. In order to avoid too much distraction between the two
parts, participants received the instructions for DAM and SDG together. After having read the
7For an extensive discussion of the concept and measurement of social value orientation, see, e.g., Van Lange
(1999) and Murphy et al. (2011).
8Each participant, made a social value orientation decision with respect to another anonymously and randomly
chosen participant in the lab. Importantly, the alter-participant does not make a decision towards the ego-
participant but toward yet another randomly chosen participant. This was known to the participants and excludes
(anticipated) reciprocity considerations.
10
instructions and before the start of DAM participants had to answer comprehension questions
about both DAM and SDG.
In the two market treatments participants interacted in the DAM for 18 rounds and in each
round there were the same three sellers and five buyers. Each seller was endowed with two units
of a good which could be sold to the buyers and each buyer could buy up to two units. Thus,
total market supply was six units and total market demand ten units, implying that buyers were
on the long side of the market. We chose to give every trader two units (instead of only one)
to create a thicker market with more trades without having to increase the number of traders.
The production costs of each of the units of the three sellers was 10 and the redemption value
of each unit of the five buyers was 100. This gives a so-called box design (Holt et al., 1986). We
chose that design because it creates distinct market experiences for agents on respectively the
short and the long side of the market.
The earnings from the sale of a unit were equal to the price at which the unit was traded,
while the earnings from the purchase of a unit were equal to 100 minus the price at which the
unit was traded. Not traded units created neither gains nor losses. The price was allowed to
have any integer value between 10 and 95 (inclusive). We chose this upper bound on the trading
price to break indifference and facilitate trade.9 More formally, in each round the earnings of a
buyer in the market were given by
u =


(100 − px) + (100− py) if the buyer buys one unit at price px
and another unit at price py
(100 − pz) if the buyer buys one unit at price pz
0 if the buyer does not buy any unit,
and the profit of a seller is given by
pi =


(px − 10) + (py − 10) if the seller sells one unit at price px
and another unit at price py
(pz − 10) if the seller sells one unit at price pz
0 if the seller does not sell any unit,
where px, py, pz ∈ {10, 11, . . . , 94, 95}.
9In the experimental literature sometimes trading bonuses are used instead. We did not do that because it
changes the competitive equilibrium prediction (see, e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993; Noussair and Tucker, 2013).
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Depending on the market role, a trader knew her own production cost or redemption value,
but did not know those of the other traders. Hence, traders did not receive any information
about the earnings of the other market participants. Participants were informed about the total
number of buyers and sellers active in the market. We chose this information regime because it
has been shown to minimize fairness considerations and to facilitate converge to the competitive
equilibrium (Smith, 1976; Holt et al., 1986). In the competitive equilibrium all six units are
traded at price 95. Sellers’ per unit equilibrium profit is 85 (95 − 10) and buyers’ per unit
equilibrium earnings are 5 (100 − 95).
In the DAM traders had to follow particular trading rules equivalent to those used in previous
double-auction market experiments:
1. Buyers make purchase offers and sellers make sale offers. An offer by a buyer consists in
offering a price at which to buy a unit. An offer by a seller consists in offering a price at
which to sell a unit.
2. Only the highest purchase offer and the lowest sale offer are the so-called pending prices
at which transactions can take place.
3. A transaction takes place automatically if the price of a purchase (sale) offer that is made is
equal or higher (lower) than the price of the pending sale (purchase) offer. The transaction
price is always the pending price (regardless of the offer that leads to the transaction). A
transaction also takes place if a pending purchase (sale) offer is accepted by a seller (buyer).
4. New price offers have to be improvements. That is, a new purchase (sale) offer has to be
higher (lower) than the pending purchase (sale) offer.
5. If a transaction takes place the market clears and any purchase offer or sale offer in the
feasible price interval is possible again.
6. The units of the good are traded one by one. That is, traders cannot make offers for or
trade several units at a time.
The DAM was conducted for 18 consecutive periods with the same fixed group of eight
participants. Participants in a market did not know who they were matched with. A trading
period ended after three minutes or when no trades were possible any more. All participants were
informed about their role in the market, buyer or seller, at the beginning of the 18 periods of the
DAM and were also told that these roles would stay constant throughout these periods. During
the DAM buyers and sellers could see the purchase and sale offers and transaction prices but
not the identities behind the offers and transactions. Hence, traders were also not able to track
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others’ individual behavior across market periods. When a trade took place, traders received
information only about their own earnings. At the end of a trading period each trader received
information about his or her total earnings in that period.
Immediately, after the 18 periods of the DAM, participants played six periods of the SDG.
The SDG was a two-person linear public goods game and pairs stayed the same throughout the
game. In each period each participant was endowed with 50 ECU and had to distribute them
between a private and a public account. We used an MPCR = 0.9 so that for every unit that a
player put into the public account both the player in question and the partner’s player obtained
0.9 units.10 Formally, in each period of the SDG, earnings of a participant i were given by
wi = 50 − gi + 0.9(g1 + g2),
with gi (i = 1, 2) being player i’s amount allocated to the public account. In the SDG, contri-
bution decisions were made simultaneously. After each participant had made his/her decision
each pair received information about decisions in their pair; that is, own contribution, other’s
contribution, own earnings, and other’s earnings.
As already mentioned above, the matching in the SDG differed between the two market
treatments, called market-partners and market-strangers. In the market-partners (henceforth,
MP) treatment each participant was matched with one of the other seven participants from the
same DAM. Matching was done such that it led to two pairs of buyers, one pair of sellers and
one pair consisting of a buyer and a seller. Specifically, the instructions specified: “You will be
matched with another buyer (seller) with whom you have interacted in the market.” Hence, in
the SDG, participants knew the market role of the other participant they have been paired with.
They were also told that they would stay matched with the same person during the six periods
of the SDG. In this way we created one pair of prospective market-losers (buyer pairs), two pairs
of prospective market-winners (seller pairs) and one pair consisting of a prospective market-loser
and market-winner (mixed pairs).
In the market-strangers (henceforth, MS) treatment each participant in a DAM was matched
with one other participant from another DAM. Here the instructions specified: “You will be
10We used a two-person version of the public goods game because it allowed us to obtain a relatively large
number of independent observations at relatively low costs. We chose the MPCR on the basis of two pilot sessions
with stand-alone two-person linear public goods game experiments with the same subject pool as in the reported
experiments. In these sessions we observed that an MPCR = 0.9 lead to efficiency levels of about 50 percent,
leaving about the same room for efficiency improvement and worsening, respectively, in the market experiments.
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matched with another buyer (seller) from another market with whom you have not interacted
in the market.” In this case the matchings for the SDG were made using participants from
two different DAMs. The sixteen subjects were matched in a way that led to four buyer-pairs,
two seller-pairs, and two mixed pairs. Like in MP, market roles were known and the described
matchings stayed the same for all periods of the SDG and participants were informed about this.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the matchings in MP and MS, respectively.
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Figure 3. Matchings in the SDG in market-partners (MP) and market-strangers (MS)
Parts 5 and 6: SWB 2 and SVO 2. After the SDG, in SWB 2 we again recorded partici-
pants’ response to the subjective well-being question shown in Figure 1 and in SVO 2 participants
again made decisions in the social value orientation circle-test.11 In SVO 2 each participant made
an allocation decision with respect to him/herself and another anonymously and randomly cho-
sen participant whom s/he did not interact with in any of the previous parts. As in SVO 1,
to avoid (anticipated) reciprocity, the matched participant did not make a decision towards the
deciding participant but towards another not previously matched participant. Again, subjects
were informed about the matching procedure but did not receive information about the decision
of ‘their’ paired others until the very end of the session.
11Alternatively, we could have placed SWB 2 and SVO 2 directly after the DAM. We did not do that because
it could have influenced behavior in the the SDG, which is our main variable of interest.
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Parts 7: sSDG. After SVO 2 a surprise restart of the SDG was announced and participants
played an additional 12 periods of the SDG. Each participant was informed that they would be
matched with the same person as in the first six periods. We introduced the surprise restart to
see if any effects on the efficiency of cooperation due to market experience would be longer lasting
and survive the re-setting commonly observed in public goods games with surprise restarts (see,
e.g., Andreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996).
3.2 Control Treatments
We conducted two control treatments. First, in order to have a benchmark to which we could
compare contribution behavior in the social dilemma game, we have run a treatment where
participants played a SDG without having experienced a market before. In that treatment,
except for that there was no DAM, all features of the design were exactly the same as in the
above described market treatments. That is, the sequence of events was the same as depicted in
Table 1 (except for item 3.) and each participant was matched with the same other person both
in the first six and the second 12 periods of the SDG. We call this treatment OSDG (standing
for ‘Only’ SDG).
Second, as we will see in the results part, there are – as intended – large earnings differences
between sellers and buyers in the DAM. To control for potential effects of these differences on
contribution behavior in the SDG, we conducted another control treatment. In this treatment,
participants received lump-sum payments before the start of the SDG. Each participant was
in one of four payment conditions. The conditions differed in respect to the received lump-sum
payment, which corresponded respectively to the average buyer and seller earnings in MP andMS.
We will call this treatment OSDG-I(ncome). Except for the lump-sum payments before the start
of the SDG, this treatment was the same as the other control treatment. It was also equivalent
to the market treatments in terms of average pre-SDG earnings, except that participants did not
earn these payments through market interactions. The instructions for the SDG in this control
treatment were kept as close as possible to those in DAM. In particular, regarding the lump-sum
payments and the matching with another participant in the SDG the instructions said: “You
have been assigned initial earnings of X ECU. The other group member is also assigned some
initial earnings. The assignments to you and the other group member are not necessarily the
same. You and the other group member will receive this amount independently of what occurs
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during the experiment.”12 We deliberately used a vague phrasing regarding the earnings of the
other group member because in DAM participants also only knew their own market earnings for
sure, whereas they did not receive information about the other group member’s market earnings.
We describe the exact lump-sum earnings and corresponding matchings in OSDG-I when we
discuss the results (see Section 6.2.1).
4 Experiment Procedures
In total 512 subjects participated in our experiment. We ran three sessions with treatment
OSDG, three with treatment OSDG-I, three with the market-partners treatment (MP) and four
with the market-strangers treatment (MS). We have data from 64 subjects in OSDG, 144 in
OSDG-I, 112 in market-partners in 14 separate markets, and 192 in market-strangers in 24
separate markets. Hence, for OSDG we have 32 statistically independent observations (i.e.,
matched pairs of participants in the SDG) and for OSDG-I 72, which are distributed over six
different conditions with 12 independent pairs per condition (see Section 6.2.1 for details). For
market-partners we have 56 pairs in the SDG (28 buyer-pairs, 14 seller-pairs, 14 mixed-pairs)
organized in 14 independent matching groups (markets) and for market-strangers we have 96
pairs in the SDG (48 buyer-pairs, 24 seller-pairs, 24 mixed-pairs) organized in 12 independent
matching groups (twins of markets across which participants are matched in the SDG).
In the two market treatments, each participant’s role (buyer or seller) was fixed for the dura-
tion of the session. General instructions were read aloud at the start of each session. Instructions
for the different parts were given on-screen and participants could read them at their own pace.13
Participants could ask questions by raising a hand. All questions were answered in private.
The experiments were conducted at the LINEEX lab at the University of Valencia using the
z-tree program of Fischbacher (2007). Each session involved one of the treatments and no one
could participate in more than one session. Performance-based earnings were counted in ECU
and total earnings consisted of the accumulated earnings across all parts. Each 100 ECU were
worth e1. Participants did not receive a show-up fee. At the end of a session participants were
privately paid out their earnings in cash. Average earnings were e18.50 for the OSDG, e33.00
12The actual amount of X ECU used in the instructions depended on the condition the participant was assigned
to (see below).
13The main reason for not reading aloud all instructions was that this would have revealed information about
the potential earnings of buyers and sellers in DAM, which we wanted to avoid.
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for OSDG-I, and e29.50 for the market treatments. OSDG and OSDG-I sessions took about 90
minutes and sessions with market treatments took about 120 minutes.
5 Research Hypotheses
Our main focus is on understanding to what extent participation in a competitive market has
repercussions for the efficiency achieved in subsequent social dilemma games. In addition, we
also study the effects of market participation on our measurements of subjective well-being and
social value orientation.
We formulate our hypotheses inspired by some of the concepts developed by
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012). Two key elements of their conceptual framework are the
notion of separability between economic incentives and social preferences and the distinction
between state-dependent and endogenous preferences.
Applied to our context separability means that experiences in different spheres of social in-
teraction do not interact with preferences or, more specifically, that the ability to efficiently
cooperate in a social dilemma game is independent of preceding market experience. This notion
of separability is implied in the view proposed by Smith (1998) that people are able to decou-
ple behavior in small-group exchange from that in anonymous markets. In our experimental
environment, the assumption of separability leads to our null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Market experience has an effect neither on the efficiency of cooperation in the
SDG nor on subjective well-being or social value orientation.
Alternatively, it has been argued that behavior can depend on the circumstances surrounding
the decision situation, which can be captured by the notion of state-dependence.14 In the words
of Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012):“State-dependence arises because actions are motivated by
a heterogeneous repertoire of preferences from spiteful to payoff-maximizing to generous, for
example, the salience of which depends on the nature of the decision situation” (p. 373).15 Our
alternative hypotheses are formulated in terms of state-dependence of behavior in the SDG.
14In the framework of Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) the term endogenous preferences is used in relation to
processes with effects that persist in the long-run, typically as the result of a process of cultural transmission. In
the context of our study, the effects we focus on can be better captured in terms of state-dependence.
15An example of how state-dependence could be incorporated into a formal model of social preferences is the
general model of Charness and Rabin (2002). This two-person model has a more standard part with own and
other’s payoff and also incorporates a particular parameter that is said to be set to 1 when the decision-maker
thinks that the counter-part is misbehaving while it is set to 0 when the counter-part is not misbehaving. The
state is whether the counter-part is misbehaving or not and this gives rise to a repertoire of two different social
preferences.
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The general alternative to our null hypothesis is that behavior will be state-dependent in the
sense that market experience will affect subsequent cooperation. Moreover, state-dependence
may affect behavior in different ways along two dimensions. First, market interaction as such
may affect behavior in the subsequent SDG in different directions. The effect could be to increase
cooperation, in accordance with the idea of doux commerce of Montesquieu (1748) or it could be
negative, in line with the social criticism of Engels (1845).
Second, as advanced in the introduction, state-dependence could lead to variations in reac-
tions depending on the type of market experience. In particular, having been on the short or
the long side of the market and having been paired with somebody from the own or the other
side may lead to different reactions. Similarly, cooperation may be affected differently depending
on whether or not one is paired with somebody one has previously competed with for scarce
resources on the same market.
We also relate our analysis to our previous work in Brandts et al. (2009) where we found
that being on the long side of a triadic exchange relation leads to lower subjective well-being
and less social value orientation, measured after the exchange relation had finished. The issue
here is whether possible effects of market experience on cooperation can be related to effects on
subjective well-being and social value orientation.
We formulate alternative hypotheses in terms of the effects on cooperation. Our analysis of
subjective well-being and social value orientation will be part of a more detailed discussion of
these alternatives.
Hypothesis 2. Market participation as such will affect subsequent cooperation.
Hypothesis 2 is two-sided, reflecting the existence of conflicting ideas on the effects of market
participation, as discussed above. In evaluating it we will simply compare SDG behavior with
and without preceding market interaction.
Importantly, our design allows us to make a number of more specific comparisons of interest.
First, we can compare market-strangers with market-partners. As mentioned in the introduction,
these two treatments are meant to capture the distinction between more local market interaction
and more distant market interaction. One may expect the different kinds of relations in the
market to affect participants’ attitudes towards the subsequent interaction. In market-partners
the experience of having competed with each other for scarce resources may on the one hand
inject some sense of social closeness and thus increase cooperation, but on the other hand it
may also induce a competitive state that could be detrimental to efficient cooperation. Market-
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strangers may create an atmosphere of more anonymity and disconnectedness. Whether this will
have a positive or negative effect on cooperation is an open question.
Second, we can hold the market-strangers vs. market-partners distinction constant and com-
pare behavior in different matchings of participants who have been on the same or on opposite
sides of the market. In this case, the issue is whether pairs of participants who both have been
assigned to the long side of the market, market-losers, cooperate better or worse than pairs with
other market experiences and pairs with no market experience. It is not easy to gauge what the
effects will be. Given that market-losers earn little income, one may expect pairs of them to
cooperate more efficiently out of the need of compensating for low earnings in the market. Also,
a sense of solidarity between them may lead to better cooperation. However, market experience
could also have a negative effect on market-losers by depleting their trust in others or triggering
spiteful behavior. Market-winners have a good experience, at least in terms of earnings, which
may on the one hand make it easier to cooperate but on the other hand also here a competitive
state of participants may affect cooperation negatively. The latter may also occur because of
satisficing effects (Simon, 1956) when market-winners have earned already sufficiently much in
the market interactions.
Under separability none of these comparisons should exhibit significant differences. However,
as just described there are reasons suggesting opposing forces under the different circumstances
and it is an empirical question, which one – if any – will prevail. We formulate this in our second
general two-sided alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The type of experienced market participation will affect subsequent cooperation
in different ways.
This hypothesis can be refined into a number of specific questions pertaining to how market
participation affects the efficiency of post-market cooperation of different pairs of individuals:
(A) Pairs of individuals who had interacted in the same market (market-partners) compared
to pairs of individuals who had interacted in distinct markets (market-strangers) and to
those without market experience?16
(B) Pairs of individuals who had both been on the favorable side of markets (market-winners)
compared to pairs of individuals who had both been on the unfavorable side of markets
16In this comparison we average the different types of matchings. We leave out the other possible comparison
of averages, where we would average for each type of matching across market-partners and market-strangers.
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(market-losers) and compared to pairs of individuals who had been on the opposite side of
markets, all three compared between market-partners and market-strangers?
(C) Pairs of individuals who had both been on the favorable side of markets compared to pairs
of individuals who had both been on the unfavorable side of markets and compared to pairs
of individuals who had been on the opposite side of markets, all three compared within
market-partners and market-strangers?
Brandts et al. (2009) found that experiencing competitive rivalry in fixed triads had a neg-
ative impact on the experienced well-being of those on the long side of the interaction and a
positive impact on those on the short side. Here we study whether this result extends to the
case of market interaction in a proper competitive market, and whether it is affected by the
distinction between market-partners and market-strangers.17
Hypothesis 4. The type of market participation will affect subjective well-being and social value
orientation.
The specific research questions we will investigate in respect to this hypothesis are whether
subjective well-being or social value orientation are affected by market participation or by the
market side a person is on.
In our set-up, if market participation has a negative effect per se, then social value orientation
is expected to be lower towards all market participants. In contrast, if social value orientation
responds to income comparisons, as e.g. in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), then social value orientation
of those on the short side of the market (market-winners) is expected to increase (or at least
not decrease) while that of those on the long side of the market (market-losers) is expected to
decrease (to compensate for the relative income disadvantage). In addition, we will be able to
investigate the effect of the market-partners vs. market-strangers distinction.
6 Results
In this section, we first briefly report on market behavior to see if our markets indeed converge
to asymmetric equilibrium outcomes as intended. Thereafter, we zoom in to our main research
17In the mentioned study, it was found for social value orientation that the powerful player in the triad did not
change his disposition towards the player who had been chosen more frequently and thus earned relatively much
but surprisingly lowered it towards the less frequently chosen and thus low earnings player. Both powerless players
lowered their disposition towards others.
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question and discuss if and how different market experiences affect behavior in the subsequent
social dilemma games. Finally, we discuss the effect of different experiences in the markets and
social dilemma games on subjective well-being and social value orientation.
6.1 Market Behavior
Figure 4 shows the average transaction price over the 18 trading periods in the two market
treatments. As expected, prices in both treatments converge to the highest possible price of
95. Of the total of 4104 possible trades only 7 were not realized and overall efficiency was with
99.8% virtually optimal. This market outcome leads to very unequal incomes. Using individual
data the averages (standard deviations) of earnings are 2672 (277) for sellers and 340 (176) for
buyers in the market-partners treatment and 2656 (324) for sellers and 346 (222) for buyers in
the market-strangers treatment.18 As expected, neither buyer nor seller earnings significantly
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Figure 4. Average trading price dynamics in both market treatments
differ between market-partners and market-strangers treatments (buyer earnings: p = 0.6434,
seller-earnings: p = 0.5371; MW-tests, 2-sided). We can conclude that our manipulation worked
as intended. With the implemented markets we achieved very different market experiences for
participants on the long and on the short side of the market, without differences between the
two market environments.
18Note that if there are any pre-existing social preferences they apparently have little effect on the outcome of
the market interaction, due to the competitiveness of the institution (see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
21
6.2 Behavior in the Social Dilemma Game
Figure 5 shows mean contributions for each of the 18 rounds in the SDG of the two market
treatments and the OSDG treatment. In rounds 1-6 there is a clear ranking of the treatments
visible. Contributions in the market-strangers treatment are above those in the control treatment
without market interaction (except for the last round), which in turn are above the ones in the
market-partners treatment. In rounds 7-18 contributions in the market-strangers and OSDG
treatments are similar, while in the market-partners treatment they are clearly below those of
the other two treatments.19
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Figure 5. Dynamics of average contributions in OSDG and the two market treatments
In our statistical analysis we treat our three main research questions one by one. Using
regression analysis, Table 2 reports tests on differences in contributions across treatments, ag-
gregated over trader matchings and respectively all periods, periods 1-6, and periods 7-18.20
In all reported specifications contributions are regressed on dummy variables identifying the
market-partners and market-strangers treatment, respectively. Treatment OSDG is the refer-
19In all treatments we observe the often documented end-of-game effect, both in round 6 and in round 18.
It should also be noted that the contributions in all three treatments exhibit a restart effect, first reported in
Andreoni (1988); that is, in round 7 contribution levels jump up to levels similar to those of rounds 1-5.
20In the main text, we report statistical tests using OLS regression analysis based on individual contributions
with standard errors corrected for dependence of observations within pairs in OSDG, within individual markets
in market-partners, and within pairs of interlinked markets in market-strangers. The results are consistent with
those of non-parametric tests, which are reported in Appendix A.1.1.
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ence category.21 Specification (1) reports the results for all 18 periods and shows that compared
to OSDG contributions in market-partners are 6.92 points lower (p = 0.036). Corroborating
the visual impression from Figure 5. An F -test comparing contributions in market-partners and
market-strangers shows that contributions are highly significantly lower in the former than in
the latter (diff.: 8.298, p < 0.001). There is no statistically significant difference between con-
tributions in market-strangers and OSDG (p = 0.622). Specifications (2) and (3) in Table 2
show a very similar picture for rounds 1-6 and 7-18 separately. In market-partners contributions
are significantly lower than in the other treatments. Interestingly, as already suggested by Fig-
ure 5, comparing contributions in rounds 1-6 and rounds 7-18 indicate that the negative effect
in market-partners does not vanish, but is rather reinforced over time.
Table 2. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments (aggregated over
trader matchings)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
all periods periods 1-6 periods 7-18
Market-partners -6.919∗∗ -5.425∗ -7.665∗∗
(3.228) (3.249) (3.424)
Market-strangers 1.379 2.968 0.585
(2.779) (2.734) (2.990)
Constant (OSDG) 29.375∗∗∗ 28.451∗∗∗ 29.837∗∗∗
(2.640) (2.589) (2.815)
R2 0.037 0.039 0.036
N 6624 2208 4416
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 16.37 15.21 14.14
p-value 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for 58 clusters.
Hence, we find that market participation can be harmful for cooperation, but that it is not
market experience per se. The efficiency of cooperation is negatively affected when one has
to cooperate with people with whom one has previously interacted in the market. Not having
competed in the same market – something that can be seen as a more anonymous environment –
21For all reported regressions here and later in the paper we have also run specifications adding period dummies
to control for time trends and Tobit instead of OLS to correct for censoring of contributions by 0 and 50. The
results are qualitatively virtually the same and reported in Appendix A.1.2.
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leads to higher cooperation than having had to compete with each other. The differences survive
the restart after the first six rounds and even become somewhat stronger. We summarize this
answer to our research question pertaining to overall cooperation levels in the following result.
Result 1. Overall, market participation harms efficient cooperation when agents previously com-
peted in the same market and has no effect when agents previously competed in different markets.
We next move to the question, whether the aggregate differences just discussed are similar for
the different trader matchings or whether they are driven by specific matchings. Recall that in
buyer matchings the two interacting participants both have had a difficult time in securing trades
and have obtained low earnings. In seller matchings participants have technically also competed
for trades but from a very comfortable position and have obtained high earnings. Finally, mixed
matchings bring together very different market experiences and earnings levels.
Figure 6 shows average contribution levels for the three distinct kinds of matchings in the
two market treatments as well as in the stand-alone OSDG. Figure 6a depicts contributions in
buyer pairs and clearly shows that buyers do worst in market-partners in all periods (expect
the very last one), whereas contributions are similar in market-strangers and OSDG. A similar
picture emerges for seller pairs (Figure 6b), specifically regarding behavior in market-partners.
Their contributions are clearly below those of sellers in market-strangers and of agents in OSDG.
Interestingly, seller pairs having experienced the market-strangers environment tend to contribute
more than agents in OSDG without market experience. Finally, for mixed pairs, Figure 6c shows
little differences across treatments.
Table 3 reports regression analysis, comparing contributions of the three different trader
matchings separately across the market treatments and OSDG, aggregated over all periods.
Again, OSDG is the reference category. The results shown in the table corroborate the visual
impressions gained from Figure 6. For buyer matchings, contributions in market-partners are
9.68 points lower than in OSDG and 8.71 points lower than in market-strangers. Both differences
are statistically significant (p = 0.013 and p = 0.008, respectively). For seller pairs we also find
that contributions in market-partners are (marginally) significantly lower than in respectively
OSDG (diff.: −8.32, p = 0.055) and market-strangers (diff.: −14.22, p < 0.001). In contrast,
comparing behavior of seller pairs in market-strangers to behavior in OSDG, we see that they
tend to contribute even more with than without market experience (diff.: 5.90, p = 0.078).
Finally, for the mixed matchings there are no statistically significant differences across treatments
(p ≥ 0.652).
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Figure 6. Average contributions over rounds in the three treatments by different trader
matchings
By and large, the differences identified when taking all periods into account, are also found
when looking at periods 1-6 and periods 7-18 separately (see Table 4). For buyer pairs contribu-
tions are lower in market-partners than in both market-strangers and OSDG already in periods
1-6 (diff.: −7.51, p < 0.010 and diff.: −6.72, p = 0.056, respectively). These differences do not
vanish but rather increase in the later periods 7-18 (diff.: −9.31, p = 0.012 and diff.: −11.16,
p = 0.010, respectively). When comparing market-strangers and OSDG, no significant differ-
ences in contributions of buyer pairs are found, neither in the early nor the later periods. For
seller pairs in periods 1-6 contributions are lower in market-partners than in market-strangers
(diff.: −13.72) and OSDG (diff.: −6.68), which is statistically highly significant in the former
(p < 0.001) but fails to be statistically significant in the latter (p = 0.112) comparison. For
the later periods 7-18 both differences increase and become statistically (marginally) significant
(diff.: −14.47, p = 0.001 and diff.: −9.14, p = 0.056, respectively). seller pairs contribute more
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Table 3. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments by trader matchings
(all periods)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -9.678∗∗ -8.319∗ -0.000
(3.768) (4.254) (4.749)
Market-strangers -0.970 5.899∗ 1.557
(3.126) (3.288) (3.433)
Constant (OSDG) 29.375∗∗∗ 29.375∗∗∗ 29.375∗∗∗
(2.640) (2.640) (2.640)
R2 0.045 0.073 0.001
N 3888 2520 2520
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 7.56 13.51 0.12
p-value 0.0080 0.0005 0.7316
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for 58 clusters.
in market-strangers than agents in OSDG, especially in the early periods (periods 1-6: diff.: 7.04,
p = 0.038; periods 7-18: diff.: 5.33, p = 0.131). For seller-buyer pairs contributions significantly
differ neither in periods 1-6 nor in periods 7-18 (p ≥ 0.289). We briefly summarize in our next
result.
Result 2. The observed adverse effects of market experience on efficient cooperation in market-
partners can be attributed both to market-losers (buyer pairs) and market-winners (seller pairs).
For seller pairs market experience in market-strangers tend to positively affect contribution be-
havior. There is no effect of market experience on contributions in mixed pairs.
The result indicates that having experienced together the severity of competition in the
experimental market negatively affects agents’ ability to successfully cooperate. Importantly,
the effect does not vanish over time and is present for both partnerships of market-losers and
partnerships of market-winners. The fact that pairs from both market sides are affected makes
it hard to explain the lower contributions purely with different income levels attained in the
market. Interestingly, market-winners in the more socially distant market-strangers treatment
are able to increase contributions relative to the control treatment. Hence, market experience
may be beneficial for cooperation provided the market experience is positive and not with the
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Table 4. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments by trader matchings
(periods 1-6 & periods 7-18)
Periods 1-6
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -6.721∗ -6.682 -1.576
(3.447) (4.140) (4.794)
Market-strangers 0.786 7.036∗∗ 3.265
(3.062) (3.318) (3.308)
Constant (OSDG) 28.451∗∗∗ 28.451∗∗∗ 28.451∗∗∗
(2.590) (2.591) (2.591)
R2 0.031 0.073 0.010
N 1296 840 840
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 7.18 12.78 1.14
p-value 0.0096 0.0007 0.2895
Periods 7-18
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -11.156∗∗∗ -9.138∗ 0.788
(4.173) (4.681) (5.069)
Market-strangers -1.848 5.331 0.703
(3.380) (3.479) (3.782)
Constant (OSDG) 29.837∗∗∗ 29.837∗∗∗ 29.837∗∗∗
(2.815) (2.816) (2.816)
R2 0.054 0.073 0.000
N 2592 1680 1680
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 6.67 11.53 0.00
p-value 0.0124 0.0013 0.9862
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively. Standard errors corrected for dependence of observations for
58 clusters.
same people one has to solve the social dilemma with. This seems consistent with the indirect
evidence of a positive effect of anonymous market integration on pro-social behavior provided in
Camerer and Fehr (2004).
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In the following we test for the observed differences in contributions between different trader
pairings, within each market treatment. Table 5 reports the results of F -tests based on regression
analysis for contributions aggregated over all periods using dummy variables for respectively
buyer pairs, seller pairs, and mixed pairs, with treatment OSDG being the reference category.22
Table 5. Tests for differences in contributions in the so-
cial dilemma game between trader matchings
within market treatments (all periods)
Market-partners Market-strangers
buyer pairs vs. seller pairs
diff. contributions -1.359 -6.869
F 0.09 5.77
p-value 0.7624 0.0207
buyer pairs vs. mixed pairs
diff. contributions -9.678 -2.527
F 4.32 0.62
p-value 0.0433 0.4356
seller pairs vs. mixed pairs
diff. contributions -8.319 4.342
F 2.58 2.30
p-value 0.1150 0.1365
Note: F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
For the market-partners treatment we observe that buyer and seller pairs do not contribute
differently (p = 0.7624) and that both contribute less than mixed trader pairs. The latter
difference is statistically significant for buyer pairs (p = 0.0433) but only close to marginal
significance for seller pairs (p = 0.1150). For the market-strangers treatment we find that pairs
of market-winners (seller pairs) contribute more than market-losers (buyer pairs) and mixed
trader pairs. The difference is statistically significant for the former comparison (p = 0.0207)
but not for the latter (p = 0.1365).23 We summarize the findings in our next result.
Result 3. With a joint market experience (market-partners) both market-loser pairs and market-
winner pairs contribute similarly and both (tend to) contribute less than mixed pairs. In markets
without a joint experience (market-strangers) pairs of market-winners (tend to) contribute more
than pairs consisting of market-losers or mixed pairs.
22For convenience we report here only the comparison results. The whole regression table can be found in
Appendix A.1.2, Table A.16.
23The results are similar when looking at periods 1-6 and 7-18 separately and reported in Appendix A.1.2,
Tables A.19 and Tables A.20.
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6.2.1 Controlling for the Effect of Income Differences
An inherent property of markets with a short and a long side is that market opportunities
and thus earnings are unequal. We deliberately implemented such markets because it reflects
important markets in the field and because it allows us to study whether behavior in a social
dilemma situation differs between market-losers and market-winners. Buyers and sellers in our
markets therefore ended up with very different earnings after the market phase and one may
hypothesize that the differences we find in the social dilemma game are not due to different
market experiences but solely a result of different earnings. In other words, it may be that
differences in contributions to the public good are merely (or mostly) a reflection of income effects.
The result that in the market-strangers treatment seller pairs, which had high market incomes,
cooperate most efficiently indeed points to such a possibility. On the other hand, however, results
in market-partners are not consistent with this interpretation as there both seller pairs with high
market earnings and buyer pairs with low market earnings cooperate rather inefficiently.
To directly test for income effects we have run the control treatment OSDG-I where par-
ticipants did not experience a market but had the same average income differences as in our
market-partner and market-stranger treatments (cf. Section 3.2 where we describe our exper-
iment design). In Section 6.1, where we discussed behavior in markets, we have seen that in
market-partners sellers earned on average 2672 ECU and buyers 340 ECU. In market-strangers
the corresponding earnings were 2656 ECU and 346 ECU. To control for these income differences,
in OSDG-I we assigned participants to the following lump-sum earnings pairs: 340-340, 2672-
2672, 2672-340 to mimic the different matchings in market-partners and 346-346, 2656-2656,
2656-346 to mimic matchings in market-strangers. In the following we explore if SDG contri-
butions of these pairs are in line with the SDG contributions of different matchings observed
in the market treatments. Specifically, we are interested if the lump-sum earnings matchings
340-340 and 2672-2672, respectively, can explain the relatively low contributions of respectively
buyer and seller pairs in market-partners. Similarly, we are particularly interested in whether
lump-sum earnings of 2656-2656 in OSDG-I could explain the relatively high contributions of
seller pairs in market-strangers.
To get a first impression Table 6 reports descriptive statistics of contributions over all periods
for the different matchings in market-partners, market-strangers, the corresponding matches in
OSDG-I, and as a benchmark OSDG. The figures reported in the table already suggest that it is
unlikely that the observed differences in contributions are due to different earnings participants
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hold before they interact in the social dilemma game. First, when looking at contributions
across different matchings within treatment OSDG-I we see little differences between high, low
and mixed earnings pairs (columns 2 and 4 in the table). They range from 29.03 of high-
earnings pairs 2656-2656 to 33.31 of low-earnings pairs 346-346. Second, the low contributions in
buyer and seller pairs in market-partners (19.70 and 21.06, respectively) are not accompanied by
low contributions in the corresponding 340-340 and 2672-2672 earnings pairs in OSDG-I, where
contributions amount to respectively 33.44 and 32.51. Third, the relatively high contributions of
seller pairs in market strangers (35.27) are not matched with higher than average contributions
in the corresponding 2656-2656 earnings pairs in OSDG-I (29.03).
Table 6. Average contributions in the social dilemma game for all treatments
by matchings (all periods)
Market-Partners OSDG-I Market-Strangers OSDG-I OSDG
buyer pairs 340-340 buyer pairs 346-346
19.70 33.44 28.41 33.31 29.38
(18.34) (19.11) (18.45) 16.67 (18.70)
seller pairs 2672-2672 seller pairs 2656-2656
21.06 32.51 35.27 29.03
(18.29) (18.49) (17.20) (18.41)
mixed pairs 2672-340 mixed pairs 2656-346
29.38 30.38 30.93 29.46
(20.12) (20.79) (20.06) (20.37)
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Statistics are based on individual contributions
in each period.
To statistically test for differences in contributions we conducted regression analysis simi-
lar to the ones reported above. Specifically, we regressed contributions on dummy variables
representing the different matchings in respectively the market-partners and market strangers
treatments and the different corresponding lump-sum earnings matchings in treatment OSDG-I,
with OSDG as the reference category. We then used F -tests to examine statistically significant
differences. In the following we report the main results. The regression table with all tests can
be found in Appendix A.1.2, Table A.21.
We first test if contributions significantly differ across different income matchings within
OSDG-I as such differences would be a first indication that pre-SDG earning differences affect
contributions in the SDG. The descriptive statistics above suggest that this is not the case and
the statistical analysis corroborates this impression. Equality of contributions across different
lump-sum earnings matchings cannot be rejected neither for those corresponding to the market-
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partners treatment (p ≥ 0.5917) nor for those corresponding to the market-strangers treatment
(p ≥ 0.3581). Second, to explain the lower contributions for buyer and seller pairings in market-
partners with the earnings achieved in the market interactions these contributions should not
significantly differ from the contributions of the corresponding 346-346 and 2672-2672 matchings.
This is not the case as in both comparisons contributions are significantly lower in market-
partners than in OSDG-I (p = 0.0026 and p = 0.0305, respectively). Finally, we test if the
higher seller pairs contributions in market-strangers are the same as contributions in 2656-2656
matchings. We find that seller pairs contributions are higher than 2656-2656 contributions (35.27
and 29.03, respectively), but the difference fails to reach statistical significance (p = 0.1146).
However, this non-significance can hardly be interpreted in favor of a positive affect of high
earnings of contributions because contributions of 346-346 matchings are with 33.31 higher than
contributions of 2656-2656 matchings and closer to those of seller pairs. Thus, there is no
evidence that higher pre-SDG earnings are the cause for the higher contributions of seller pairs
in market-strangers. We summarize our discussion in the next result.
Result 4. The differences in contributions in the social dilemma game observed in the market
treatments cannot be attributed to the earnings differences generated in the market interactions.
6.3 Subjective well-being and social value orientation
In this section we first discuss if and how market experience affects subjective well-being followed
by a discussion of the effect on social value orientation. Recall that we asked participants to
respond to our subjective well-being question at two points during the experiment: in Part 1,
at the very beginning of the experiment (initial subjective well-being), and in Part 5, after the
market interaction (in the market treatments) and the first six rounds of the SDG had taken place
(final subjective well-being). To control for inter-individual variability we focus on the change
in these measures from the first to second measurement point.24 Table 7 depicts descriptive
Table 7. Changes in subjective well-being and social value orientation
Change in subjective well-being Change in social value orientation
Treatment Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N
Market-partners -0.500 2.344 112 -2.447 17.619 112
Market-strangers -0.729 2.599 192 -6.031 19.259 192
OSDG -0.234 1.771 64 -4.538 13.682 64
24Descriptive statistics of the initial and final values of these measures can be found in Appendix A.2, Table A.24.
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Table 8. Regression: change in subjective well-being
dep. var.: change in subjective well-being
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Earnings in SDG 1 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.247)
Market-partners -0.087
(0.259)
Market-strangers -0.593∗∗
(0.256)
Buyer -1.130∗∗∗
(0.285)
Seller 0.796∗∗
(0.243)
Market-partners*Buyer -0.614∗
(0.333)
Market-partners*Seller 0.672∗∗
(0.334)
Market-strangers*Buyer -1.424∗∗∗
(0.335)
Market-strangers*Seller 0.859∗∗∗
(0.248)
Constant (OSDG) -3.236∗∗∗ -2.237∗∗ -2.475∗∗∗
(0.664) (0.714) (0.660)
R2 0.039 0.155 0.1691
N 368 368 368
MP vs MS Seller vs Buyer all comp. sig.
F(1,57) 3.68 43.96 except
p-value 0.0599 0.0000 MS*Seller vs MP*Seller
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and percent level, respectively. Standard errors
corrected for dependence of observations for 58 clusters.
statistics of these changes in the market treatments and OSDG. Focusing on subjective well-
being first we see a general decline in this measure in all three treatments and this decline
appears to be stronger in the market treatments than in OSDG.
To test if these differences are significant we have conducted regression analysis with the
change in subjective well-being as the dependent variable and as independent variables the
treatment participants have been in (dummy variable ‘Market-partners’ and ‘Market-strangers’
with OSDG being the reference category) and individual earnings in the first six periods of the
SDG (‘Earnings in SDG 1’). Specification (1) in Table 8 shows that there is a general statistically
significant decline in subjective well-being (see Constant) that is significantly stronger for those
who experienced the market-strangers treatment (p = 0.024). For market-partners the coefficient
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Table 9. Change in subjective well-being: comparison of
market roles (cf. specification (3) in Table 8)
MP*buyer=MP*seller MS*buyer=MS*seller
F(1,57) 8.36 44.58
p-value 0.0054 0.0000
MP*buyer=MS*buyer MP*seller=MS*seller
F(1,57) 4.21 0.38
p-value 0.0448 0.5427
MP*buyer=MS*seller MP*seller=MS*buyer
F(1,57) 21.37 28.31
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
is also negative but statistically not significant (p = 0.739). Between the two market treatments
the difference in the decrease in subjective well-being is statistically marginally significant at
p = 0.060. Not surprisingly earnings in the SDG have a highly significant positive impact on the
change in subjective well-being (p ≤ 0.001).
Specification (2) of Table 8 distinguishes between buyers and sellers (and for the moment
ignores which market they have been in). The results for this regression show that, relative to
OSDG participants, sellers report a significant increase in their subject well-being (p = 0.002),
while buyers experience a significant decrease (p ≤ 0.001). The difference between buyers and
sellers is highly significant (p ≤ 0.001). Also in this specification earnings in the SDG have a
positive impact on the change in subjective well-being (p ≤ 0.007).
Finally, specification (3) shows that the buyers experience a (marginal) significant negative
effect in both market-partners (p = 0.066) and market-strangers (p < 0.001), whereas it is sig-
nificantly positive for sellers irrespective of the type of experienced market (market-partners:
p = 0.066, market-strangers: p < 0.001). All differences between buyers and sellers are statisti-
cally significant (p ≤ 0.005; see Table 9).
We summarize the results pertaining to subjective well-being as follows:
Result 5. Subjective well-being is generally decreasing over time. In both market environments,
it decreases most strongly for market-losers (buyers) and least strongly for market-winners (sell-
ers).
In Table 7 the right hand side reports descriptive statistics of participants’ change in so-
cial value orientation. Consistent with the literature (Sonnemans et al., 2006; Brandts et al.,
2009), social value orientation exhibits a general decline over time. Interestingly, relative to the
benchmark OSDG the decline appears stronger for participants in market-strangers and weaker
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Table 10. Regression: change in social value orientation
dep. var.: change in social value orientation
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Earnings in SDG 1 0.039 0.027 0.034
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
Market-partners 3.101
(2.510)
Market-strangers -2.047
(2.180)
Buyer -1.742
(1.887)
Seller 2.483
(2.386)
Market-partners*Buyer 2.740
(2.361)
Market-partners*Seller 3.386
(4.088)
Market-strangers*Buyer -4.276∗∗
(2.088)
Market-strangers*Seller 1.842
(2.714)
Constant (OSDG) -21.489∗∗ -16.165∗ -19.491∗
(10.217) (8.572) (10.015)
R2 0.027 0.023 0.041
N 368 368 368
MP vs MS Seller vs Buyer all comp. sig.
F(1,57) 3.18 5.57 except
p-value 0.0800 0.0217 MS*Seller vs MP*Seller
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and percent level, respectively. Standard errors
corrected for dependence of observations for 58 clusters.
for those in market-partners. To test for statistical significance we have run regressions similar
to those for subjective well-being. Table 10 reports the results. The regressions confirm the
general decrease in social value orientation but show little significant differences between the
OSDG benchmark and, respectively, the market treatments and trader roles. The exception are
buyers in the market-strangers treatment who decrease their social value orientation significantly
more than participants in OSDG (specification (3), p = 0.045). However, there are interesting
differences between buyers and sellers. When disregarding the market treatments we see that
buyers decrease their social value orientation significantly more than sellers (specification (2),
p = 0.0217). Using the results from specification (3), Table 11 shows that this is mainly due
to the difference in market-strangers (p < 0.001). Buyers decrease their social value orienta-
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Table 11. Change in social value orientation: comparison
of market roles (cf. specification (3) in Table 10)
MP*buyer=MP*seller MS*buyer=MS*seller
F(1,57) 0.03 12.51
p-value 0.8662 0.0008
MP*buyer=MS*buyer MP*seller=MS*seller
F(1,57) 7.02 0.11
p-value 0.0104 0.7431
MP*buyer=MS*seller MP*seller=MS*buyer
F(1,57) 0.08 3.23
p-value 0.7795 0.0776
tion more than sellers also in market-partners, but the decrease is statistically not significant
(p = 0.8662).
We summarize the results regarding social value orientation as follows.
Result 6. Social value orientation is generally decreasing over time. Overall, market-losers
(buyers) decrease their social value orientation more than market-winners (sellers). This effect
is strongest for market-losers who interacted in market-strangers before.
7 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we explored whether competing in a market under different conditions affects the
efficiency of interaction in a subsequent social dilemma game. We find that efficiency in the social
dilemma is lower for people who competed with each other in the market on the same side than for
people who interacted in different markets or for people without market experience. This holds
both for market-losers and market-winners. It appears that having been competitors on the same
market hampers later cooperation between people. In this sense competitive market experience
is harmful for efficient cooperation. Having competed on the same side in the same market is
harmful for subsequent cooperation, even if this competition has taken place on the favorable
side of the market. Interestingly, pairs formed by one market-loser and one market-winner from
the same market do not experience this drop in efficiency. These results are consistent with the
notion that direct competition destroys affective social ties or may even lead to negative affective
ties as discussed in van Dijk and van Winden (1997) and van Winden (2012).
We also find a positive effect of competition on the efficiency of cooperation, but only when
market-winners from two separate markets have been paired. This indicates that having had a
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positive experience on a market can lead to more efficient outcomes but only when the competi-
tion was not with people one also needs to solve the social dilemma with. This finding resonates
with the observations of Camerer and Fehr (2004) in small-scale societies. They find that expo-
sure to market interactions with strangers can have a positive effect on social behavior towards
partners from the own society.
Next to the effects on cooperative behavior, we find that market participation also affects sub-
jective well-being and social value orientation. Our results show that for market-losers subjective
well-being and social value orientation both worsen compared to market-winners. In addition,
the social value orientation of market-strangers worsens with respect to that of market-partners.
It is not easy to interpret this result. A possible interpretation is that the higher social distance
in the market-strangers setting has a more negative impact on social value orientation, although
it may be a stretch to use the notion of social distance in the context of a lab experiment.
Overall, our findings on the effects of market experience on the efficiency of cooperation are
in line with the view of Bowles (1998) presented in the introduction but also refine it. Market
experience does affect cooperation but it is neither market experience per se nor being on the long
or short side on the market per se that is adverse to efficient cooperation. It is the fact of having
competed with each other on the same market and on the same side that makes subsequent
cooperation difficult, irrespective of having been a market-loser or market-winner. Moreover,
market experience can have a positive effect on subsequent cooperation for market-winners but
only when the social dilemma needs to be solved with somebody one has not interacted with
before on the same market.
Interestingly, in our experiment the market experience effects on cooperation appear to be
decoupled from the effects on subjective well-being and social value orientation. In both market
treatments buyers score worse on these individual measures than sellers and participants in
market-strangers score worse than those having experienced market-partners. This suggests
that worse subjective well-being not necessarily impedes the ability to cooperate efficiently and
that worse social value orientation towards a generalized other does not necessarily correlate
with the inclination to cooperate with a specific other. However, we also need to note a caveat
regarding these latter results. Both individual characteristics are not measured immediately
after the market experience because our foremost focus was on the effect of market experience
on cooperation behavior. The measurements are therefore confounded with experience in the
social dilemma game and future research could try to explore causal effects of market experience
on subjective well-being and social value orientation. Further, the subjective well-being measure
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relies on self-assessment and is therefore noisy or even biased. Future research may investigate
subjective well-being using more objective measures.
We have motivated our hypotheses using the framework of Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012),
who argue that preferences are state-dependent in the sense that “. . . actions are motivated by a
repertoire of heterogeneous preferences the salience of which depends on the nature of the decision
situation.” (p.372) The nature of the decision situation can also be affected by social experiences
and different experiences can trigger different states. Thus, our results can be understood in
terms of state-dependent preferences. We provide evidence that market experience can affect
other social behavior but this evidence does not allow us to pin down precisely what mechanisms
are behind these effects. The investigation of these mechanisms could be an exciting future
research avenue.
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A Additional Statistical Results
A.1 Contributions in the Social Dilemma Game
A.1.1 Descriptive Statistics and Non-Parametric Tests
Tests for differences in contributions in the social dilemma game across treatments
(aggregated over trader matchings). (cf. Table 2)
Table A.1. Contributions in social dilemma game
(all trader matchings, all periods)
Treatment mean st. dev. N1
Market-partners 22.456 7.148 14
Market-strangers 30.754 3.120 12
OSDG 29.375 15.037 32
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.0673
Pair-wise comparisons:2
MP vs MS p = 0.0353
MP vs OSDG p = 0.0656
MS vs OSDG p = 0.1550
Note:
1 all statistics are based on striclty indpendent ob-
servations; 2 Dunn tests with false-discovery rate adjust-
ment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995); MP (MS) stands
for Market-partners (-strangers)
Table A.2. Contributions in social dilemma game
(all trader matchings, periods 1-6)
Treatment mean st. dev. N1
Market-partners 23.025 7.556 14
Market-strangers 31.418 3.154 12
OSDG 28.451 14.744 32
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.0975
Pair-wise comparisons:2
MP vs MS p = 0.0466
MP vs OSDG p = 0.1471
MS vs OSDG p = 0.0999
Note:
1 all statistics are based on striclty indpendent ob-
servations; 2 Dunn tests with false-discovery rate adjust-
ment; MP (MS) stands for Market-partners (-strangers)
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995)
A.1
Table A.3. Contributions in social dilemma game
(all trader matchings, periods 7-18)
Treatment mean st. dev. N1
Market-partners 22.172 7.502 14
Market-strangers 30.422 3.612 12
OSDG 29.837 16.035 32
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.0964
Pair-wise comparisons:2
MP vs MS p = 0.0551
MP vs OSDG p = 0.0746
MS vs OSDG p = 0.1928
Note:
1 all statistics are based on striclty indpendent ob-
servations; 2 Dunn tests with false-discovery rate adjust-
ment; MP (MS) stands for Market-partners (-strangers)
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995)
A.2
Tests for differences in contributions in the social dilemma game across treatments
by trader trader matchings. (cf. Tables 3 and 4)
Table A.4. Contributions in social dilemma game by trader matchings (all periods)
Trader matching* buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Treatment mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. N1
Market-partners 19.697 10.348 21.056 12.832 29.375 15.190 14
Market-strangers 28.405 6.003 35.274 7.028 30.932 7.864 12
OSDG 29.375 15.037 29.375 15.037 29.375 15.037 32
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.0993 p = 0.0357 p = 0.9134
Pair-wise comparisons:2
MP vs MS p = 0.0583 p = 0.0161 p = 0.5290
MP vs OSDG p = 0.0665 p = 0.0578 p = 0.4788
MS vs OSDG p = 0.4417 p = 0.0982 p = 1.0000
Note:
* in OSDG trader matching refers to matched pair in SDG; 1 all statistics are based on striclty
indpendent observations; 2 Dunn tests with false-discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995);
MP (MS) stands for Market-partners (-strangers)
Table A.5. Contributions in social dilemma game by trader matchings (periods 1-6)
Trader matching* buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Treatment mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. N1
Market-partners 21.729 8.751 21.768 12.413 26.875 15.507 14
Market-strangers 29.236 5.854 35.486 7.428 31.715 7.368 12
OSDG 28.451 14.744 28.451 14.744 28.451 14.744 32
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.1711 p = 0.0284 p = 0.7630
Pair-wise comparisons:2
MP vs MS p = 0.1101 p = 0.0121 p = 0.6961
MP vs OSDG p = 0.1032 p = 0.0574 p = 0.3606
MS vs OSDG p = 0.2498 p = 0.0805 p = 0.4559
Note:
* in OSDG trader matching refers to matched pair in SDG; 1 all statistics are based on striclty
indpendent observations; 2 Dunn tests with false-discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995);
MP (MS) stands for Market-partners (-strangers)
A.3
Table A.6. Contributions in social dilemma game by trader matchings (periods 7-18)
Trader matching* buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Treatment mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. N1
Market-partners 18.682 11.849 20.699 14.385 30.625 16.213 14
Market-strangers 27.990 6.707 35.168 7.323 30.540 9.051 12
OSDG 29.837 16.035 29.837 16.035 29.837 16.035 32
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.0392 p = 0.0477 p = 0.9835
Pair-wise comparisons:2
MP vs MS p = 0.0345 p = 0.0264 p = 0.6708
MP vs OSDG p = 0.0225 p = 0.0432 p = 1.0000
MS vs OSDG p = 0.4935 p = 0.1683 p = 0.4942
Note:
* in OSDG trader matching refers to matched pair in SDG; 1 all statistics are based on striclty
indpendent observations; 2 Dunn tests with false-discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995);
MP (MS) stands for Market-partners (-strangers)
A.4
Tests for differences in contributions in the social dilemma game by trader trader
matchings with treatments. (cf. Tables 5, A.16, A.19 and A.20)
Table A.7. Tests for differences in contributions in social dilemma game
by trader matchings within treatments (all periods)
Treatments Market-partners Market-strangers
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.1241 p = 0.0872
Pair-wise comparisons:2
Buyer pairs vs seller pairs p = 0.4027 p = 0.0473
Buyer pairs vs mixed pairs p = 0.0903 p = 0.2613
Seller pairs vs mixed pairs p = 0.0769 p = 0.0980
Note:
1 all statistics are based on striclty indpendent observations; 2 Dunn tests
with false-discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995)
Table A.8. Tests for differences in contributions in social dilemma game
by trader matchings within treatments (periods 1-6)
Treatments Market-partners Market-strangers
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.6404 p = 0.1089
Pair-wise comparisons:2
Buyer pairs vs seller pairs p = 0.4449 p = 0.0572
Buyer pairs vs mixed pairs p = 0.3447 p = 0.2367
Seller pairs vs mixed pairs p = 0.5698 p = 0.1313
Note:
1 all statistics are based on striclty indpendent observations; 2 Dunn tests
with false-discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995)
Table A.9. Tests for differences in contributions in social dilemma game
by trader matchings within treatments (periods 7-18)
Treatments Market-partners Market-strangers
Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.0956 p = 0.0941
Pair-wise comparisons:2
Buyer pairs vs seller pairs p = 0.3878 p = 0.0533
Buyer pairs vs mixed pairs p = 0.0678 p = 0.2838
Seller pairs vs mixed pairs p = 0.0644 p = 0.0944
Note:
1 all statistics are based on striclty indpendent observations; 2 Dunn tests
with false-discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995)
A.5
A.1.2 Additional Regression Analysis
Table A.10. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments (aggregated over
trader matchings) - OLS with period dummies (cf.
Table 2)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
all periods periods 1-6 periods 7-18
Market-partners -6.919∗∗ -5.425 -7.665∗∗
(3.232) (3.253) (3.428)
Market-strangers 1.379 2.968 0.585
(2.783) (2.737) (2.993)
Constant (OSDG) 34.321∗∗∗ 33.037∗∗∗ 31.900∗∗∗
(2.521) (2.472) (2.829)
Period dummies yes yes yes
R2 0.087 0.1351 0.066
N 6624 2208 4416
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 16.33 15.18 14.10
p-value 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for 58 clusters.
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Table A.11. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments (aggregated over
trader matchings) - Tobit regressions (cf. Table 2)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
all periods periods 1-6 periods 7-18
Market-partners -13.128∗∗ -8.382 -15.940∗∗
(5.936) (5.360) (6.670)
Market-strangers 0.723 4.208 -1.313
(5.248) (4.610) (5.984)
Constant (OSDG) 35.230∗∗∗ 31.964∗∗∗ 37.162∗∗∗
(5.095) (4.413) (5.785)
F (2, N − 2) 7.71 6.81 7.05
Prob > F 0.0005 0.0011 0.0009
N 6624 2208 4416
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 15.27 13.45 13.48
p-value 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively. Tobit regressions with lower (upper) bound on contributions
at 0 (50) and standard errors corrected for dependence of observations for
58 clusters.
Table A.12. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments by trader match-
ings (all periods) - OLS with period dummies (cf.
Table 3)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -9.678∗∗ -8.319∗ -0.000
(3.777) (4.268) (4.765)
Market-strangers -0.970 5.899∗ 1.557
(3.133) (3.299) (3.444)
Constant (OSDG) 34.917∗∗∗ 32.356∗∗∗ 32.859∗∗∗
(2.478) (2.335) (2.269)
Period dummies yes yes yes
R2 0.100 0.114 0.046
N 3888 2520 2520
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 7.52 13.42 0.12
p-value 0.0081 0.0005 0.7325
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for 58 clusters.
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Table A.13. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments by trader match-
ings (all periods) - Tobit regressions (cf. Table 3)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -17.310∗∗∗ -15.408∗ -0.317
(6.447) (7.900) (9.677)
Market-strangers -3.740 8.510 2.840
(5.708) (6.075) (7.104)
Constant (OSDG) 34.724∗∗∗ 34.933∗∗∗ 36.067∗∗∗
(4.963) (5.180) (5.691)
F (2, N − 2) 4.24 5.79 0.10
Prob > F 0.0144 0.0031 0.9027
N 3888 2520 2520
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 6.49 11.38 0.11
p-value 0.0109 0.0008 0.7374
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively. Tobit regressions with lower (upper) bound on contributions
at 0 (50) and with standard errors corrected for dependence of observations
for 58 clusters.
A.8
Table A.14. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments by trader match-
ings (periods 1-6 & periods 7-18) - OLS with period
dummies (cf. Table 4)
Periods 1-6
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -6.721∗ -6.682 -1.576
(3.454) (4.152) (4.808)
Market-strangers 0.786 7.036∗∗ 3.265
(3.068) (3.328) (3.318)
Constant (OSDG) 33.370∗∗∗ 31.639∗∗∗ 32.589∗∗∗
(2.378) (2.294) (2.244)
Period dummies yes yes yes
R2 0.129 0.123 0.083
N 1296 840 840
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 7.16 12.71 1.14
p-value 0.0097 0.0007 0.2910
Periods 7-18
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -11.156∗∗∗ -9.138∗ 0.788
(4.181) (4.696) (5.085)
Market-strangers -1.848 5.331 0.703
(3.387) (3.490) (3.795)
Constant (OSDG) 32.778∗∗∗ 31.271∗∗∗ 31.166∗∗∗
(2.871) (2.728) (2.777)
Period dummies yes yes yes
R2 0.089 0.111 0.030
N 2592 1680 1680
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 6.65 11.46 0.00
p-value 0.0125 0.0013 0.9863
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for 58 clusters.
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Table A.15. Tests for differences in contributions in the social
dilemma game across treatments by trader match-
ings (periods 1-6 & periods 7-18) - Tobit regressions
(cf. Table 4)
Periods 1-6
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -10.550∗ -9.998 -1.163
(5.485) (6.691) (8.700)
Market-strangers 0.174 10.667∗ 6.786
(4.963) (5.710) (6.095)
Constant (OSDG) 31.623∗∗∗ 31.917∗∗∗ 32.523∗∗∗
(4.271) (4.483) (4.808)
F (2, N − 2) 3.33 5.66 0.82
Prob > F 0.0361 0.0036 0.4403
N 1296 840 840
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 6.06 10.88 0.90
p-value 0.0140 0.0010 0.3432
Periods 7-18
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2) (3)
buyer pairs seller pairs mixed pairs
Market-partners -21.238∗∗∗ -18.531∗∗ -0.029
(7.769) (9.697) (10.889)
Market-strangers -6.021 7.284 0.527
(6.527) (6.697) (8.332)
Constant (OSDG) 36.561∗∗∗ 36.658∗∗∗ 38.148∗∗∗
(5.649) (5.857) (6.524)
F (2, N − 2) 4.22 5.01 0.00
Prob > F 0.0148 0.0068 0.9975
N 2592 1680 1680
MP vs MS
F(1,57) 5.77 9.92 0.00
p-value 0.0164 0.0017 0.9589
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively. Tobit regressions with lower (upper) bound on contributions
at 0 (50) and with standard errors corrected for dependence of observations
for 58 clusters.
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Table A.16. Contributions in the social dilemma game: com-
paring trader matchings within market treatments
(all periods) (cf. Table 5)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners Market-strangers
buyer-buyer -9.678∗∗ -0.970
(3.778) (3.135)
seller-seller -8.319∗ 5.899∗
(4.264) (3.297)
seller-buyer -0.000 1.557
(4.760) (3.442)
Constant (OSDG) 29.375∗∗∗ 29.375∗∗∗
(2.646) (2.647)
R2 0.058 0.018
N 3168 4608
buyer-buyer vs seller-seller
F 0.09 5.77
p-value 0.7624 0.0207
buyer-buyer vs seller-buyer
F 4.32 0.62
p-value 0.0433 0.4356
seller-buyer vs seller-seller
F 2.58 2.30
p-value 0.1150 0.1365
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for respectively 46 and 44 clusters in specification (1) and
(2). F -test is F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
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Table A.17. Contributions in the social dilemma game: com-
paring trader matchings within market treatments
(all periods) - OLS with period dummies (cf. Ta-
bles A.16 and 5)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners Market-strangers
buyer-buyer -9.678∗∗ -0.970
(3.788) (3.141)
seller-seller -8.319∗ 5.899∗
(4.275) (3.303)
seller-buyer -0.000 1.557
(4.773) (3.448)
Constant (OSDG) 34.232∗∗∗ 33.696∗∗∗
(2.471) (2.450)
Period dummies yes yes
R2 0.095 0.076
N 3168 4608
buyer-buyer vs seller-seller
F 0.09 5.75
p-value 0.7630 0.0209
buyer-buyer vs seller-buyer
F 4.30 0.62
p-value 0.0438 0.4364
seller-buyer vs seller-seller
F 2.57 2.29
p-value 0.1160 0.1372
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for respectively 46 and 44 clusters in specification (1) and
(2). F -test is F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
A.12
Table A.18. Contributions in the social dilemma game: compar-
ing trader matchings within market treatments (all
periods) - Tobit regressions (cf. Tables A.16 and 5)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners Market-strangers
buyer-buyer -17.698∗∗∗ -4.002
(6.657) (5.617)
seller-seller -15.498∗∗ 8.617
(7.789) (6.283)
seller-buyer -0.261 2.693
(8.944) (6.668)
Constant (OSDG) 35.005∗∗∗ 35.215∗∗∗
(5.150) (5.161)
F (3, N − 3) 3.56 1.69
Prob > F 0.0138 0.167
N 3168 4608
buyer-buyer vs seller-seller
F 0.08 4.99
p-value 0.7830 0.0255
buyer-buyer vs seller-buyer
F 4.33 1.18
p-value 0.0376 0.2777
seller-buyer vs seller-seller
F 2.60 0.98
p-value 0.1067 0.3228
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively. Tobit regressions with lower (upper) bound on contributions
at 0 (5) and standard errors corrected for dependence of observations for
respectively 46 and 44 clusters in specification (1) and (2). F -test is F1,45
(F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
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Table A.19. Contributions in the social dilemma game: com-
paring trader matchings within market treatments
(periods 1-6)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners Market-strangers
buyer-buyer -6.721∗ -0.786
(3.345) (3.071)
seller-seller -6.683 7.036∗∗
(4.150) (3.327)
seller-buyer -1.576 3.265
(4.806) (3.316)
Constant (OSDG) 28.451∗∗∗ 28.451∗∗∗
(2.597) (2.597)
R2 0.030 0.020
N 1056 1536
buyer-buyer vs seller-seller
F 0.00 4.42
p-value 0.9919 0.0414
buyer-buyer vs seller-buyer
F 1.68 0.63
p-value 0.2020 0.4316
seller-buyer vs seller-seller
F 0.98 2.32
p-value 0.3272 0.1349
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for respectively 46 and 44 clusters in specification (1) and
(2). F -test is F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
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Table A.20. Contributions in the social dilemma game: com-
paring trader matchings within market treatments
(periods 7-18)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners Market-strangers
buyer-buyer -11.156∗∗ -1.848
(4.183) (3.390)
seller-seller -9.138∗ 5.331
(4.692) (3.488)
seller-buyer 0.788 0.703
(5.081) (3.792)
Constant (OSDG) 29.837∗∗∗ 28.837∗∗∗
(2.823) (2.824)
R2 0.075 0.018
N 2112 3072
buyer-buyer vs seller-seller
F 0.15 5.52
p-value 0.7025 0.0234
buyer-buyer vs seller-buyer
F 5.35 0.54
p-value 0.0253 0.4656
seller-buyer vs seller-seller
F 2.87 1.85
p-value 0.0970 0.1810
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, re-
spectively. OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for dependence
of observations for respectively 46 and 44 clusters in specification (1) and
(2). F -test is F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
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Table A.21. Contributions in the social dilemma game: comparing trader match-
ings within market treatments and earnings matchings within OSDG-I
(all periods) (cf. page 30)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners & OSDG-I Market-strangers & OSDG-I
buyer-buyer -9.678∗∗ -0.970
(3.760) (3.119)
seller-seller -8.319∗ 5.899∗
(4.244) (3.281)
seller-buyer -0.000 1.557
(4.738) (3.425)
low-low 4.065 3.940
(4.399) (4.117)
high-high 3.139 -0.347
(4.791) (4.294)
high-low 1.005 0.088
(5.178) (5.063)
Constant (OSDG) 29.375∗∗∗ 29.375∗∗∗
(2.634) (2.634)
R2 0.058 0.016
N 4464 5904
high-high vs high-low
F 0.13 0.01
p-value 0.7226 0.9371
high-high vs low-low
F 0.03 0.85
p-value 0.8626 0.3581
high-low vs low-low
F 0.29 0.52
p-value 0.5917 0.4743
high-high vs seller-seller
F 4.85 2.55
p-value 0.0305 0.1146
low-low vs buyer-buyer
F 9.63 1.88
p-value 0.0026 0.1738
high-low vs seller-buyer
F 0.03 0.09
p-value 0.8663 0.7626
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. OLS regres-
sions with standard errors corrected for dependence of observations for respectively 46 and 44
clusters in specification (1) and (2). F -test is F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
low-low, high-high, and high-low stands for 2672-2672, 340-340, and 2672-340 in market-partners
and 2656-2656, 346-346, and 2656-346 in market-strangers.
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Table A.22. Contributions in the social dilemma game: comparing trader match-
ings within market treatments and earnings matchings within OSDG-I
(all periods) - OLS with period dummies (cf. Table A.21)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners & OSDG-I Market-strangers & OSDG-I
buyer-buyer -9.678∗∗ -0.970
(3.767) (3.124)
seller-seller -8.319∗ 5.899∗
(4.252) (3.285)
seller-buyer -0.000 1.557
(4.747) (3.430)
low-low 4.065 3.940
(4.408) (4.123)
high-high 3.139 -0.347
(4.800) (4.300)
high-low 1.005 0.088
(5.188) (5.070)
Constant (OSDG) 32.794∗∗∗ 32.548∗∗∗
(2.529) (2.511)
Period dummies yes yes
R2 0.105 0.070
N 4464 5904
high-high vs high-low
F 0.13 0.01
p-value 0.7231 0.9372
high-high vs low-low
F 0.03 0.85
p-value 0.8628 0.3588
high-low vs low-low
F 0.29 0.52
p-value 0.5924 0.4749
high-high vs seller-seller
F 4.83 2.54
p-value 0.0309 0.1151
low-low vs buyer-buyer
F 9.59 1.88
p-value 0.0027 0.1744
high-low vs seller-buyer
F 0.03 0.09
p-value 0.8666 0.7630
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. OLS regres-
sions with standard errors corrected for dependence of observations for respectively 46 and 44
clusters in specification (1) and (2). F -test is F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers).
low-low, high-high, and high-low stands for 2672-2672, 340-340, and 2672-340 in market-partners
and 2656-2656, 346-346, and 2656-346 in market-strangers.
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Table A.23. Contributions in the social dilemma game: comparing trader match-
ings within market treatments and earnings matchings within OSDG-I
(all periods) - Tobit regressions (cf. Table A.21)
dep. var.: contribution to public good
Specification (1) (2)
Market-partners & OSDG-I Market-strangers & OSDG-I
buyer-buyer -18.474∗∗∗ -3.968
(6.922) (5.863)
seller-seller -16.194∗∗ 8.592
(8.102) (6.222)
seller-buyer -0.291 2.682
(9.296) (6.603)
low-low 7.324 4.226
(9.294) (7.523)
high-high 5.939 -1.321
(10.033) (7.590)
high-low 1.669 0.204
(10.161) (9.423)
Constant (OSDG) 35.566∗∗∗ 35.150∗∗∗
(5.296) (5.065)
F (6, N − 6) 3.25 0.94
Prob > F 0.0034 0.4630
N 4464 5904
high-high vs high-low
F 0.12 0.02
p-value 0.7301 0.8775
high-high vs low-low
F 0.01 0.47
p-value 0.9055 0.4933
high-low vs low-low
F 0.23 0.17
p-value 0.6315 0.6829
high-high vs seller-seller
F 4.30 2.04
p-value 0.0381 0.1528
low-low vs buyer-buyer
F 8.16 1.60
p-value 0.0043 0.2060
high-low vs seller-buyer
F 0.03 0.07
p-value 0.8676 0.7869
Note:
∗∗∗, (∗∗), [∗] indicated significance on 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Tobit
regressions with lower (upper) bound of contributions at 0 (5) and standard errors corrected for
dependence of observations for respectively 46 and 44 clusters in specification (1) and (2). F -test
is F1,45 (F1,43) for market-partners (market-strangers). low-low, high-high, and high-low stands
for 2672-2672, 340-340, and 2672-340 in market-partners and 2656-2656, 346-346, and 2656-346
in market-strangers.
A.18
A.2 Subjective well-being and social value orientation - additional statistics
Table A.24. Subjective well-being and social value orientation: descriptive statistics of ini-
tial and final values as well as changes) (cf. Table 7)
Initial subjective well-being Initial social value orientation
Treatment Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N
Market-partners 3.196 1.749 112 11.571 26.660 112
Market-strangers 2.911 1.594 192 17.659 20.386 192
OSDG 2.922 1.525 64 21.876 21.164 64
Final subjective well-being Final social value orientation
Treatment Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N
Market-partners 3.696 2.265 112 9.124 19.312 112
Market-strangers 3.641 2.347 192 11.627 21.165 192
OSDG 3.156 1.720 64 17.338 21.512 64
Change in subjective well-being Change in social value orientation
Treatment Mean St.Dev. N Mean St.Dev. N
Market-partners -0.500 2.344 112 -2.447 17.619 112
Market-strangers -0.729 2.599 192 -6.031 19.259 192
OSDG -0.234 1.771 64 -4.538 13.682 64
Note: For subjective well-being a higher value indicates worse well-being; change in subjective well-being
is initial - final. For social value orientation higher degrees (smaller 90 degree) indicate stronger pro-social
value orientation; change in social value orientation is final - initial.
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B Experiment Instructions
This section contains the original Spanish versions of the general instructions, which were read
aloud at the beginning of a session and which were the same in all treatments, the specific in-
structions and screen-shots of market-partners and the specific instructions and screen-shots of
market-strangers. In addition a complete English translation is provided of the general instruc-
tions and the specific instructions and screen-shots of market-strangers.
The instructions of OSDG are identical to the instructions of the SDG in market-partners and
market-strangers, respectively. The instructions for OSDG-I are identical to the instructions of
OSDG, except for the difference in the announcement of the lump-sum payment at the beginning
of the experiment. These instructions are available from the authors upon request.
B.1
 B.2 
 
General Instructions (original Spanish version) 
INSTRUCCIONES 
Bienvenido al experimento. El propósito de este experimento es estudiar cómo toman los individuos 
decisiones en diferentes situaciones. Las instrucciones son simples y si las sigues cuidadosamente puedes 
ganar una considerable cantidad de dinero con las decisiones que tomes. La cantidad que ganes puede 
también depender de las decisiones de los demás participantes y de sucesos aleatorios. La cantidad total de 
dinero que ganes en el experimento se te pagará en efectivo de manera confidencial al final del experimento. 
Nadie conocerá los pagos recibidos por el resto de participantes. Durante el experimento podéis hacer 
preguntas en cualquier momento. Podéis preguntarnos en cualquier momento las dudas que tengáis 
levantando primero la mano. Fuera de esas preguntas, cualquier tipo de comunicación entre vosotros distinta 
de la especificada en las instrucciones no está permitida y puede llevar a la exclusión inmediata del 
experimento. 
 
1. Este experimento consta  de varias partes. Estas son las instrucciones Generales para todas las partes 
del experimento. Recibirás las instrucciones para las diferentes partes al inicio de cada una de las 
partes. 
 
2. En algunas partes conocerás (partes) de tus ingresos, pero en otras no conocerás tus ingresos 
inmediatamente. Sólo al final del experimento se te informará de los ingresos que hayas obtenido en 
cada parte y de los ingresos totales. En el experimento no hablaremos de Euros sino de ECUs. Al 
final del experimento, todos los ingresos que hayas obtenido en este experimento se cambiarán a la 
tasa de cambio de 100 ECUs = €1. 
 
3. Al principio de cada parte del experimento verás en pantalla las instrucciones correspondientes.  
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS READ OUT ALOUD AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
EXPERIMENT 
Instructions 
 
Welcome to this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how individuals make 
decisions in different situations. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully 
you can earn a considerable amount of money with the decisions you make. How much you 
earn may also depend on the decisions of other participants and on random events. The total 
amount of money you earn in the experiment will be paid out to you in cash confidentially at the 
end of the experiment. Nobody will learn the payments received by other participants. During 
the experiment you can ask questions at any moment. Please do not ask the questions aloud but 
raise your hand. One of the experimenter team will come to you to answer your question. Apart 
from these questions, any kind of communication other than specified in the instructions is 
not allowed and will lead to the immediate exclusion from the experiment. 
 
1. This experiment consists of several parts. These are the “General Instructions” which 
apply to all parts of the experiment. You will receive the instructions for the different 
parts at the beginning of each part. 
 
2. In some parts you will learn about (parts of) the earnings received but in some parts you 
will not learn your earnings immediately. Only at the end of the experiment, you will be 
informed about all your earnings in each part and your total earnings. In the experiment 
we will not talk of Euro but of ECU. At the end of the experiment, all your earnings will 
be exchanged at the exchange rate of  
100 ECU = 1 EUR. 
 
3. At the beginning of each part, you will see the corresponding instructions on the screen 
or you will be handed over new instructions on paper. 
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TRANSLATED INSTRUCTIONS AND SCREENS FOR MARKET STRANGERS 
Screen 1 
 
Part1 
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Screen 2 
Please indicate with the help of the image how you feel at this moment. 
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Screen 3 
Part 2: Circle 
Trial Round 
 
B.55 
 
Screen 4 
Instructions 
1. In this part of the experiment you are going to take just one decision. Your decision consists 
in choosing a distribution of ECUs between you and another participant. The server will 
choose the other participant randomly and you are not going to interact with him/her in any 
other part of the experiment. Furthermore, this matching is not reciprocal, that is the other 
participant, to whom you can allocate an amount of ECUs with your decision, is not the 
same who can allocate an amount of ECUs to you. 
2. You are going to observe a circle on the screen. By choosing a point on this circle you 
allocate an amount of ECUs to you and to the other participant. Each point on the circle 
corresponds to an amount that will be added to (or subtracted from) your earnings and the 
other participant’s earnings with whom you are connected. By taking your decision you can 
increase (or reduce) your earnings and the earnings of the other participant. The feasible 
distributions range from +200 ECUs to -200 ECUs. 
3. With the help of the mouse you will be able to click on any point on the circle. If you do that 
an arrow will be drawn, which connects the center of the circle with the point that you will 
have selected. Moreover, the exact amount of ECUs that you have selected for you and for 
the other participant will be shown below the circle. 
4. Your earnings in this part will be determined by your decision (the amount of ECUs that 
you allocate to yourself), and by the ECUs that the participant who is connected with you 
allocates to you. Remember that the latter is not the same than the one to whom you allocate 
ECUs with your decision. Concretely, your earnings in this part will be the sum of these two 
amounts. 
NOTE: The amounts can be positive or negative. It can be the case that the sum of the two amounts 
is negative. 
5. You will be able to change your decision until you are satisfied with your decision by 
clicking on different points on the circle. When you are satisfied with your decision you 
have to confirm it  by clicking on the OK button.  
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Screen 5 
With the help of the mouse select a point on the circle. Remember that you can change your 
decision as many times as you wish. 
When you are finished press OK. 
NOTE: Remember that you will not interact with the participant to whom you assign ECUs in 
no other part of the experiment and that reciprocity in the matching. 
FOR ME: 0.00 ECUs 
FOR THE OTHER: 0.00 ECUs 
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Screen 6 
Part 2: Circle 
Decision 
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Screen 7 
With the help of the mouse select a point on the circle. Remember that you can change your 
decision as many times as you wish. 
When you are finished press OK. 
NOTE: Remember that you will not interact with the participant to whom you assign ECUs in 
no other part of the experiment and that reciprocity in the matching. 
FOR ME: 0.00 ECUs 
FOR THE OTHER: 0.00 ECUs 
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Screen 8 
Part 3: Markets 
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BUYERS 
Screen 9 
Instructions 
1. This part of the experiment consists of 24 rounds. These 24 rounds are split into 18 
rounds in which you and the other participants will act in a market and, thereafter, 6 
rounds where each participant will be paired with exactly one other participant to make 
decisions in another situation. 
2. In the first 18 rounds you will act as a trader in a market with 7 other participants. 
Hence, in total there will be 8 traders active in the market. These 8 traders will stay the 
same for all 18 rounds. 
3. Each participant will be either a buyer or a seller. In each round there will be 3 sellers 
and 5 buyers active in the market. Each seller stays a seller throughout all 18 rounds and 
each buyer stays a buyer for all 18 rounds. The server has randomly determined that 
you will be a buyer in this part of the experiment.  
4. The good to be traded is divided into distinct “units”. We will not specify a name for the 
good but simply refer to units of the good. In each round sellers can sell their units to 
the buyers. The prices that are negotiated will determine each trader's earnings in ECUs. 
5. In the following we will first explain how you as a buyer can earn money through 
purchasing units. Thereafter, we will explain how sales and purchases are take place in 
the market. 
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Screen 10 
Units to buy and buyer values: 
In each round, each buyer can buy up to 2 units, but is free to buy no or only one unit. For each unit 
purchased during a round a buyer receives a buyer value of 100 ECUs. For a unit a buyer does not 
purchase the buyer does not receive any buyer value for that unit. 
 
Buyer earnings: 
Buyers make profits by purchasing units at prices that are below their buyer values. These profits are 
computed by subtracting each unit's price from its buyer value. Therefore, 
 
buyer's earnings per unit = 100 - purchasing price for unit. 
 
If a buyer does not purchase any unit in a round, this buyer does not earn any ECU's in this round. 
 
For each unit a seller sells, the seller has to pay selling costs and can earn money by selling the unit 
at a price higher  than the selling costs. In each round, each seller can sell at most 2 units, but may 
also sell no or only one unit. If a seller does not sell any unit in a round, this seller does not earn any 
ECU's in this round. 
 
 The prices at which sellers and buyers are allowed to trade are all inter numbers  
 between 10 and 95. That is the permitted trading prices are {10, 11, 12, 13, 14, … , 92, 
 93, 94, 95}. 
 
6. Each round will last a maximum of 3 minutes. The units that have not been exchanged at the 
end of the 3 minutes are lost, that is, they are not carried over to the next round. 
7. Buyer values and seller costs are private information and will not be revealed neither during 
nor after the experiment. 
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Screen 11 
Rules for making transactions 
 
In each round there are the following rules for making transactions: 
 
1. Buyers make buying offers and sellers make selling offers. A buying offer consists offering a 
price at which to purchase. A selling offer consists in offering a price  at which to sell.  
 
2. Only the highest buying offer and the lowest selling offers are the so-called standing prices at 
which trades can take place. 
 
3. The transaction price is always the standing buying (selling) price. A transaction takes place 
if the standing buying (selling) is accepted by a seller (buyer). 
 
4. Newly submitted price offers have to be improvements. That is, a new buying (selling) price 
has to be higher (lower) than the standing buying (selling) price. 
 
5. If a transaction takes place the market clears and any buying and selling price in the feasible 
range are possible again. Note, that the prices of the buying offers (selling offers) bid (ask) 
prices have to be equal or lower (higher) than the corresponding buyer value (seller selling 
cost). 
 
6. The units of the goods are traded one by one. That is, it is not possible to offer or exchange 
several units at the same time. 
 
In what follows we show you an example. 
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Screen 12 
This is the screen a buyer faces when making and accepting offers in a round, which is 
explained on the next screen. 
 
B.64 
 
Screen 13 
This is an example screen of a buyer in a market in which two selling offers (left column),  two 
transaction (central column) and two buying offers (right column) have been made. 
In the top row, it is shown that this buyer has already purchased one unit of the good, and 
therefore he still can buy one other unit. 
Selling offers 
A seller has made a selling offer of 15. After that another seller (or the same that made the 
earlier offer) has made a selling offer of 12. The standing price is the lower price, in this case 
12. 
Transaction prices 
This buyer has already made one transaction (purchase) for a value of 23 ECUs (value shown in 
blue). Other participants of your market have made a transaction for a value of 16 ECUs. 
Buying offers 
Another buyer has made a buying offer of 45 ECUs. After that the buyer of the example has 
made an offer of 50 ECUs (highlighted in blue). The standing price is 50. 
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Screen 14 
This screen is the same as screen 12, but with the highlighted items mentioned on screen 13. 
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Screen 15 
This is the end of the instructions for the market where you will act as a trader. This market will 
last for  18 rounds. After 18 rounds you will participate for another 6 rounds (rounds 19 to 24) in 
another decision making situation. This will be explained below. 
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Screen 16 
7. In each of the rounds that follow the market, you are paired with one other participants. This other 
participant will be the same throughout these 6 rounds. You will be paired with another buyer from 
another market with whom you have not interacted in the market. 
8. In each round, each participant receives an endowment of 50 ECUs. In each round  the decision to 
be made is to choose how much you allocate to a Fund A and to a Fund B. In each round, you will 
have to decide how many ECUs to deposit in fund B and the rest will be allocated to fund A 
automatically. 
9. For each ECU that you  allocate to fund A your earnings will increase by 1 ECU. 
10. For each ECU that you  allocate to fund B, your earnings will increase by 0.9 ECUs, and also the 
earnings of the other person you are paired with will increase by 0.9 ECUs. Hence, each ECU 
allocated to fund B increases your and the other's earnings together with 1.8 ECU. This also holds 
for each ECU the other person allocates to fund B. Hence, note that your earnings from fund B as 
well as your total earnings, depend on your allocation to fund B and on the allocation to fund B of 
the person you are paired with. 
11. In summary, your total earning in one round are determined in the following way: 
 
Individual earnings 
= 
Earnings fund A          + Earnings fund B 
 
50 ECU – my allocation to fund B + 
(0.9 x my allocation to fund B) + 
(0.9 x other person's allocation 
to fund B) 
Note, that the earnings of the other person are calculated in an equivalent way. 
12. At the end of each round, you will be informed of the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
paired with. Moreover, you will receive information on your and the other person's earnings in each 
round. This information regarding the allocation and earnings of all previous rounds will appear on 
your computer screen. 
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Screen 17 
Please answer the following questions. The experiment will proceed only after all 
participants have correctly answered all questions. 
 
1. This part of the experiment has in total how many rounds. 
Answer: XXX rounds 
 
2. First you will trade goods on a market. For how many rounds will the market be open?  
 
Answer: XXX rounds 
 
3. In the market there are sellers and buyers. You are a buyer. In total, how many sellers 
and buyers will be active on the market? 
 
Answer: XXX sellers, XXX buyers 
 
4. In each round sellers can sell units and buyers can buy units. How many units can each 
seller sell at most and each buyer buy at most? 
 
Answer: X units 
 
5. In each round the same participants will be active as buyers and sellers on the market? 
 
 Answer: YES NO 
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6. As a buyer you can earn money by buying units at prices below your buyer value. 
Consider the following arbitrary example. For each unit you buy your buyer value is 85 
ECU. In a given round, you buy one unit at a price of 34 ECU and another unit at a 
price of 76 ECU. What are your total earnings in that round?  
 
Answer: XX ECU 
 
7. As a buyer you can earn money by buying units at prices below your buyer value. 
Consider the following arbitrary example. For each unit you buy your buyer value is 85 
ECU. In a given round, you do not buy any unit. What are your total earnings in that 
round?  
 
Answer: XX ECU 
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Screen 18 
 
8. After 18 rounds the market interaction is over and you will be paired with one other 
participant for another decision making situation, where you and the other participant 
will have to allocate 50 ECU to fund A and fund B in each round. How many rounds 
will this other decision making situation last? 
 
Answer: XX rounds 
 
9. In all 6 rounds of this other decision making situation you are paired with the same 
other participant? 
 
Answer: YES NO 
 
 
10. In each round you are paired with: 
 
O a seller you have interacted with in the market 
O a seller you have NOT interacted with in the market 
O a buyer you have interacted with in the market 
O a buyer you have NOT interacted with in the market 
 
(check the correct answer) 
 
11. In this other decision making situation, Consider the following arbitrary situation in a 
round: 
Your allocation to the fund B is  50 ECU, the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
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paired with is 50 ECU. 
In this situation 
your earnings would be: …... 
the earnings of the person you are paired with would be: …. 
 
12. In this other decision making situation. Consider the following arbitrary situation in a 
round: 
Your allocation to the fund B is  0 ECU, the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
paired with is 0 ECU. 
In this situation 
your earnings would be: …... 
the earnings of the person you are paired with would be: …. 
 
13. In this other decision making situation. Consider the following arbitrary situation in a 
round: 
Your allocation to the fund B is  12 ECU, the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
paired with is 34 ECU. 
In this situation 
your earnings would be: …... 
the earnings of the person you are paired with would be: …. 
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SELLERS 
Screen 19 
 
Instructions 
1. This part of the experiment consists of 24 rounds. These 24 rounds are split into 18 
rounds where you and the other participants will act on a market and, thereafter, 6 
rounds where each participant will be paired with exactly one other participant to make 
allocation decisions in another situation. 
 
2. In the first 18 rounds you will act as a trader on a market with 7 other participants. 
Hence, in total there will be 8 traders active on the market. These 8 traders will stay the 
same for all 18 rounds. 
  
3. Each participant will be either a buyer or a seller. In each round there will be 3 sellers 
and 5 buyers on the market. Each seller stays a seller throughout all 18 rounds and each 
buyer stays a buyer for all 18 rounds. The server has randomly determined that you will 
be a seller in this part of the experiment.  
 
4. The good to be traded is divided into distinct “units”. We will not specify a name for the 
good but simply refer to units. In each round sellers can sell their units to buyers. The 
prices that are negotiated will determine each trader's earnings in ECUs. 
 
5. In the following we will first explain how you as a seller can earn money through 
selling units. Thereafter, we will explain how sales and purchases are arranged on the 
market. 
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Screen 20 
Rules for making transactions 
 
In each round there are the following rules for making transactions: 
 
1. Buyers make buying offers and sellers make selling offers. A buying offer consists offering a 
price at which to purchase. A selling offer consists in offering a price  at which to sell.  
2. Only the highest buying offer and the lowest selling offers are the so-called standing prices at 
which trades can take place. 
  
3. The transaction price is always the standing buying (selling) price. A transaction takes place 
if the standing buying (selling) is accepted by a seller (buyer). 
  
4. Newly submitted price offers have to be improvements. That is, a new buying (selling) price 
has to be higher (lower) than the standing buying (selling) price. 
 
5. If a transaction takes place the market clears and any buying and selling price in the feasible 
range are possible again. Note, that the prices of the buying offers (selling offers) bid (ask) 
prices have to be equal or lower (higher) than the corresponding buyer value (seller selling 
cost). 
  
6. The units of the goods are traded one by one. That is, it is not possible to offer or exchange 
several units at the same time. 
 
In what follows we show you an example. 
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Screen 21 
Units to sell and seller costs: 
In each round, each seller can sell at most 2 units, but is free to sell no units or only one unit. 
For each unit sold during a round a seller incurs costs of 10 ECUs. For a unit a seller does not 
sell the seller does not incur the costs for  that unit. 
  
 Seller earnings: 
 Sellers make profits by selling units at prices that are above their costs. These profits are 
computed by subtracting each unit's costs from its selling price. Therefore, 
 
 seller's earnings per unit = selling price for unit – 10. 
  
If a seller does not sell any unit in a round, this seller does not earn any ECU's in this round. 
 
For each unit a buyer purchases, the buyer receives a buyer value and can earn money by 
purchasing the  unit at a price lower than the buyer value. In each round, each buyer can 
purchase at most 2 units, but may also purchase no units or only one unit. If a buyer does not 
purchase any unit in a round, this buyer does not earn any ECU's in this round. 
 
The prices at which sellers and buyers are allowed to trade are all inter numbers between 10 and 
95. That is the permitted trading prices are {10, 11, 12, 13, 14, … , 92, 93, 94, 95}. 
 
6.  Each round will last for a maximum of 3 minutes. The units that at the end of the 3 minutes 
have not been sold are lost, that is, they are not carried over to the next round. 
 
7.Buyer values and seller costs are private information and will not be revealed neither during 
nor after the experiment.   
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Screen 22 
This is the screen a buyer faces when making and accepting offers in a round, which is 
explained on the next screen. 
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Screen 23 
This is an example screen of a seller in a market in which two selling offers (left column),  two 
transactions (central column) and two buying offers (right column) have been made. 
In the top row, it is shown that this seller has already purchased one unit of the good, and 
therefore he still can sell one other unit. 
Selling offers 
Another seller has made a selling offer of 15. After this seller has made a selling offer of 12 
(highlighted in blue). The standing price is the lower price, in this case 12. 
Transaction prices 
This seller has already made one transaction (sale) for a value of 23 ECUs (value shown in 
blue). Other participants of your market have made a transaction for a value of 16 ECUs. 
Buying offers 
Another buyer has made a buying offer of 45 ECUs. After that another buyer has made an offer 
of 50 ECUs. The standing price is 50. 
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Screen 24 
This screen is the same than screen 22, but with the highlighted items mentioned on screen 23. 
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Screen 25 
This is the end of the instructions for the market where you will act as a trader. This market will 
last for  18 rounds. After 18 rounds you will participate for another 6 rounds (rounds 19 to 24) in 
another decision making situation. This will be explained below. 
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Screen 26 
   
7.In each of the rounds that follow the market, you are paired with one other participants. This other 
participant will be the same throughout these 6 rounds. You will be paired with another buyer from 
another market with whom you have not interacted in the market. 
8. In each round, each participant receives an endowment of 50 ECUs. In each round  the decision to 
be made is to choose how much you allocate to a Fund A and to a Fund B. In each round, you will 
have to decide how many ECUs to deposit in fund B and the rest will be allocated to fund A 
automatically. 
9.For each ECU that you  allocate to fund A your earnings will increase by 1 ECU. 
10.For each ECU that you  allocate to fund B, your earnings will increase by 0.9 ECUs, and also the 
earnings of the other person you are paired with will increase by 0.9 ECUs. Hence, each ECU 
allocated to fund B increases your and the other's earnings together with 1.8 ECU. This also holds 
for each ECU the other person allocates to fund B. Hence, note that your earnings from fund B as 
well as your total earnings, depend on your allocation to fund B and on the allocation to fund B of 
the person you are paired with. 
11.In summary, your total earning in one round are determined in the following way: 
Individual earnings 
= 
Earnings fund A          + Earnings fund B 
 
50 ECU – my allocation to fund B + 
(0.9 x my allocation to fund B) 
+ (0.9 x other person's 
allocation to fund B) 
Note, that the earnings of the other person are calculated in an equivalent way. 
12. At the end of each round, you will be informed of the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
paired with. Moreover, you will receive information on your and the other person's earnings in each 
round. This information regarding the allocation and earnings of all previous rounds will appear on 
your computer screen. 
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Screen 27 
Please answer the following questions. The experiment will proceed only after all 
participants have correctly answered all questions. 
 
1. This part of the experiment has in total how many rounds. 
 
Answer: XXX rounds 
 
2. First you will trade goods on a market. For how many rounds will the market be open?  
 
Answer: XXX rounds 
 
3. In the market there are sellers and buyers. You are a buyer. In total, how many sellers 
and buyers will be active on the market? 
 
Answer: XXX sellers, XXX buyers 
 
4. In each round sellers can sell units and buyers can buy units. How many units can each 
seller sell at most and each buyer buy at most? 
 
Answer: X units 
 
5. In each round the same participants will be active as buyers and sellers on the market? 
 
 Answer: YES NO 
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6. As a buyer you can earn money by buying units at prices below your buyer value. 
Consider the following arbitrary example. For each unit you buy your buyer value is 85 
ECU. In a given round, you buy one unit at a price of 34 ECU and another unit at a 
price of 76 ECU. What are your total earnings in that round?  
 
Answer: XX ECU 
 
7. As a buyer you can earn money by buying units at prices below your buyer value. 
Consider the following arbitrary example. For each unit you buy your buyer value is 85 
ECU. In a given round, you do not buy any unit. What are your total earnings in that 
round?  
 
Answer: XX ECU 
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Screen 28 
 
8. After 18 rounds the market interaction is over and you will be paired with one other 
participant for another decision making situation, where you and the other participant 
will have to allocate 50 ECU to fund A and fund B in each round. How many rounds 
will this other decision making situation last? 
 
Answer: XX rounds 
 
9. In all 6 rounds of this other decision making situation you are paired with the same 
other participant? 
 
Answer: YES NO 
 
 
10. In each round you are paired with: 
 
O a seller you have interacted with in the market 
O a seller you have NOT interacted with in the market 
O a buyer you have interacted with in the market 
O a buyer you have NOT interacted with in the market 
 
(check the correct answer) 
 
11. In this other decision making situation, Consider the following arbitrary situation in a 
round: 
Your allocation to the fund B is  50 ECU, the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
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paired with is 50 ECU. 
In this situation 
your earnings would be: …... 
the earnings of the person you are paired with would be: …. 
 
12. In this other decision making situation. Consider the following arbitrary situation in a 
round: 
Your allocation to the fund B is  0 ECU, the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
paired with is 0 ECU. 
In this situation 
your earnings would be: …... 
the earnings of the person you are paired with would be: …. 
 
13. In this other decision making situation. Consider the following arbitrary situation in a 
round: 
Your allocation to the fund B is  12 ECU, the allocation to fund B of the person you are 
paired with is 34 ECU. 
In this situation 
your earnings would be: …... 
the earnings of the person you are paired with would be: …. 
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SELLERS AND BUYERS 
(These screens are the ones the participants see during the experiment). 
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Screen 29 
This screen shows the transaction screen of a seller at the beginning of a round. 
 
 
B.86 
 
Screen 30 
This screen shows the transaction screen of a buyer at the beginning of a round. 
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Screen 31 
All the possible market transactions have been made. 
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Screen 32 
The time of the market round is over. 
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Screen 33 
Purchased units: 1 
Earnings in this round: 90 
Accumulated earnings: 90 
Number of unit: 1, Price: 10 
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Screen 34 
This has been the last market round. Now you will participate for another 6 rounds (rounds 19 
to 24) in the other decision making situation mentioned in the instructions. 
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Screen 35 
Part 4: Allocation to funds 
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Screen 36 
Remember that you will now participate during 6 rounds (rounds 19 to 24) in the other decision 
making situation mentioned in the introduction. This is a brief reminder of these rounds work. 
 
1. In each of the 6 rounds, you are paired with the same person, who has been a buyer of the 
other market with whom you have not interacted in the market. 
 
2. In each round, you and the other person receive an endowment of 50 ECUs, which you will 
have to allocate between the fund A and the fund B. 
 
3. For each ECU that you  allocate to fund A your earnings will increase by 1 ECU. For each 
ECU that you allocate to fund B, your earnings and the earnings of the other person will 
increase by 0.9 ECUs. 
 
In summary, your total earnings in a round are determined in the following way: 
 
 Individual earnings = Earnings from fund A + Earnings from fund B 
 
Observe that the earnings of the other person are calculated in an equivalent way 
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Your assignment to Fund B:____ 
 
Remember that the maximum value that you can introduce is 50. 
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Results screen 
 
Round   My allocation   Allocation of the other   My earnings  Earnings of the other  
    1                10                             40                           85.0                   55.0   
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Screen 39 
Part 5 
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Screen 40 
Please indicate with the help of the image how you feel at this moment. 
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Screen 41 
Part 6: Circle 
Decision 
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Screen 42 
With the help of the mouse select a point on the circle. Remember that you can change your 
decision as many times as you wish. 
When you are finished press OK. 
NOTE: Remember that you will not interact with the participant to whom you assign ECUs in 
no other part of the experiment and that reciprocity in the matching. 
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Screen 43 
Part 7: Allocation to funds 
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Screen 44 
Instructions 
This part consists of 12 rounds. In these 12 rounds you are in the same decision making 
situation as in the one that you have just been during 6 rounds. You are paired with the same 
person as before. 
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Screen 45 
Your assignment to Fund B:____ 
 
Remember that the maximum value that you can introduce is 50. 
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Screen 46 
Round   My allocation   Allocation of the other   My earnings  Earnings of the other  
    1                 0                                0                           50.0                   50.0  
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Final Results 
 
Part 2: Circle 1   You have selected 0.00 ECUS. Your partner has selected for you: 0.00 ECUs 
 
Part 3: Market    198.00 ECUs 
 
Part 4: Allocation to funds   98.40 ECUs 
 
Part 6: Circle 2   You have selected 0.00 ECUS. Your partner has selected for you: 0.00 ECUs 
 
Part 7: Allocation to funds    98.40 ECUs 
 
Total: 394.8 ECUs 
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Screen 48 
Fill in your personal data, please 
Gender: male/female 
What is your age? 
Nationality 
What is your major? 
Which year are you in? 
How many of the other participants are your friends? 
In how many experiments have you already participates 
Were the instructions clear on a scale from 1 to 7?  
